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INTRODUCTION 
In March 2007, almost exactly a quarter-century after the first Equal 
Rights Amendment’s ratification failure, a bipartisan group of lawmakers 
reintroduced the rechristened but textually identical “Women’s Equality 
Amendment” in both houses of Congress.  Politicians and pundits declared 
the initiative the first serious attempt to revive the amendment in decades, 
suggesting that unlike previous quiet, desultory efforts, advocates of equal 
rights meant business this time.1  The amendment’s reintroduction provoked 
reactions ranging from enthusiasm to derision to incredulity.  Some wel-
comed the ERA’s revival as an opportunity to revisit unresolved questions 
of gender equality and justice.2  Opponents bemoaned the amendment as te-
diously redundant, shockingly radical, or both.3  Still others, including long-
time proponents of women’s rights, questioned whether a renewed 
campaign for a controversial and arguably ill-defined constitutional 
amendment was the wisest allocation of resources and political capital.4  
Commentators debated how an ERA would change existing law, how an in-
creasingly conservative judiciary would interpret its text, and how the 
amendment effort would alter the political and partisan landscape.5 
If these questions evoke a feeling of déjà vu, their eerie familiarity is 
no coincidence.  The question of whether to continue to pursue feminist 
goals through a constitutional amendment despite the bitter ratification de-
feat of 1982 arose even before the first ERA’s demise became official.  
Congressional proponents resolved to reintroduce the ERA in 1983, and 
both chambers held extensive hearings before and after the House narrowly 
voted to reject “ERA II.”  Early scholarly accounts of the ERA’s rise and 
fall largely viewed ERA II as a postscript to ERA I, if they discussed it at 
all.  This Article examines ERA II as a distinct phenomenon, with a consti-
tutional and political meaning quite different from that of ERA I.   
The debate over ERA II occurred at a pivotal turning point in the his-
tory of legal feminism and of constitutional amendment advocacy.  In dia-
logue with their opponents, women’s rights advocates grappled with 
difficult doctrinal dilemmas largely unaddressed in earlier congressional 
 
1  Juliet Eilperin, New Drive Afoot to Pass Equal Rights Amendment, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2007, at 
A1. 
2  See, e.g., Martha Burk & Eleanor Smeal, The One Sure Way to Guarantee Equal Rights for Wom-
en, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr. 30, 2007, at 15. 
3  See, e.g., Phyllis Schlafly, Equal Rights Redux; The ERA: Still a Bad Idea, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 
2007, at M3; Phyllis Schlafly, Left Schemes to Revive ERA, HUMAN EVENTS, Apr. 16, 2007, at 1.   
4  See, e.g., Frances Coleman, Don’t Let It All Slip Away with the ERA, PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, 
Ala.), May 20, 2007, at D1; Rob Hotakainen, Equal Rights Amendment Divides Party, AKRON BEACON 
J., May 20, 2007, at A14; Jonathan Turley, The Revival of the Equal Rights Amendment, ROLL CALL, 
Apr. 16, 2007, at 4. 
5  See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Be Careful What You Wish For, LEGAL TIMES, June 4, 2007, at 58; Postings 
of Ilya Somin and Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy (Apr. 9–13, 2007), http://volokh.com/
posts/chain_1176163135.shtml. 
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debates over ERA I.  They articulated a vision of “equality of rights under 
the law” that eschewed “equality in theory”—formal equality—and em-
braced “equality in fact,” which dismantled “neutral” laws and practices 
that disadvantaged women.6  With ERA II, the proposed constitutional 
amendment enjoyed a new career as a partisan political weapon.  Ulti-
mately, feminists’ ERA II experience convinced the movement’s lawyers 
that amendment advocacy could not accomplish their reconfigured agenda.  
In reinventing the ERA, feminists took an important step toward transform-
ing the legal aspirations and strategies of the women’s movement and the 
very nature of constitutional change advocacy. 
 
 * * * 
 
The Equal Rights Amendment’s ratification deadline passed on June 
30, 1982, with the amendment failing to win the required three-fourths ma-
jority of states.  Postmortems from scholars and advocates poured in over 
the next several years, assessing the reasons for the ERA’s defeat.7  More 
recently, many scholars have shifted their attention from dissecting the 
ERA’s failure to measuring its stealthy success.8  Though there is consider-
able disagreement over how the transformation came about, constitutional 
law experts agree that feminists ultimately succeeded in achieving many, if 
not most, of their goals through litigation and legislation, despite the ERA’s 
defeat.9  Assessing the merits of this claim is tricky, for at least two reasons.  
First, answering the question of how much of what the ERA would have 
done that was instead accomplished through other means assumes that we 
can know what the ERA would have done—how it would have been inter-
preted by courts; how it would have been implemented by Congress and the 
Executive Branch; how advocates would have extracted new meanings and 
new ramifications with regard to issues the amendment’s earlier proponents 
 
6  See infra Part II.B. 
7  See, e.g., MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED (1986); JANET K. BOLES, THE POLITICS OF 
THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1979); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986); 
DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE SHERRON DE HART, SEX, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF ERA (1990); 
GILBERT Y. STEINER, CONSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY: THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS 
AMENDMENT (1985). 
8  See, e.g., Cynthia Harrison, ‘Heightened Scrutiny’: An Alternative Route to Equality for U.S. 
Women, in WOMEN AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 347 (Sybil A. Schwarzenbach & Patricia 
Smith eds., 2003); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1332–34 (2006); David A. Strauss, The 
Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001). 
9  See, e.g., Ilya Somin, What Effect Would the Equal Rights Amendment Have if Enacted?, Volokh 
Conspiracy, Apr. 7, 2007, http://volokh.com/posts/1176163135.shtml (“As Northwestern University law 
professor Andrew Koppelman puts it, Phyllis Schlafly and other opponents [of the ERA] won the battle 
but lost the war: ‘The ERA was defeated, but its rule against sex discrimination was incorporated into 
constitutional law anyway, by judicial interpretation of the 14th Amendment . . . .’  In fact, says Kop-
pelman, ‘it’s hard to imagine it making any difference at all.’”). 
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never contemplated; and how the answers to all of these questions would 
have changed over time.  Second, the question of whether feminists gained 
by other means what they hoped to achieve through an ERA belies the fact 
that what they hoped to achieve was a moving target.   
By the early 1980s, much of what feminists sought from the ERA di-
verged significantly from the preoccupations of proponents and opponents 
during the early-1970s creation of ERA I’s legislative history.  To some de-
gree, the ERA’s evolving meaning reflected feminists’ successes and fail-
ures under existing constitutional provisions.  But it also revealed 
substantial change over time in what feminists hoped to achieve through an 
amendment: a constitutional response not only to intentional discrimination 
and laws that explicitly denied women opportunities, but also to the unin-
tentional perpetuation of inequality through laws and policies that appeared 
neutral on their face—a conception of equality that included the right to af-
firmative action, remedies for disparate impact discrimination, and broader 
freedom from discrimination based on pregnancy.  
The debate over ERA II provides an excellent case study in the crea-
tion of constitutional meaning through amendment advocacy.  Even (espe-
cially) after a decade of bitter contention over the ERA, the amendment’s 
meaning—what it would do in the short and long term—was far from clear.  
Though the text of ERA II exactly replicated that of ERA I,10 the ratification 
battle had transformed the contest’s terrain, implicating issues barely con-
templated in the original congressional debates.  The initial ratification pe-
riod had not proven conducive to a coordinated, internally consistent, and 
explicit account of the amendment’s legal ramifications.  Instead, propo-
nents often found themselves on the defensive, and decisionmaking was dif-
fuse.  In contrast, the reintroduction of the ERA and the emergence of 
sophisticated opposition to the amendment in Congress forced advocates to 
reexamine exactly what they wanted from the ERA and to refine their ac-
count of its impact on the law.  The congressional hearings on ERA II 
prompted feminists to evaluate how far they had come, to assess how far 
they wished to go, and to clarify exactly how much of their redefined agen-
da the ERA could help them achieve.   
Today, it is far from obvious how one should interpret ERA II in the 
larger context of constitutional amendment advocacy.  It was even less self-
evident in 1982 and 1983, when feminists, their allies, and their opponents 
surveyed the political and legal landscape in the wake of the defeat of ERA 
I.  Part I of this Article offers three possible accounts of ERA II’s purpose 
and significance.  Part I.A, which examines ERA II as a political weapon, 
suggests a role for amendment advocacy beyond the creation of constitu-
 
10  The text of the Equal Rights Amendment read as follows: “Section 1.  Equality of rights under 
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.  Section 
2.  Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this Article.  
Section 3.  This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.”  
103:1223  (2009) A New E.R.A. or a New Era? 
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tional meaning.  While feminists primarily sought to alter women’s legal 
and constitutional status, their congressional allies were at least as eager to 
make political hay of the Reagan Administration’s less than enthusiastic 
embrace of women’s rights.  Even if a successful constitutional amendment 
remained out of reach, these politicians calculated, forcing opponents to 
vote “no” on equal rights for women might boost the electoral fortunes of 
Democrats and moderate Republicans, or at least help to discredit the Rea-
gan Administration in advance of its reelection campaign and undermine 
social conservatives’ apparent hold on the GOP.  In the wake of the ERA’s 
defeat, women’s organizations publicly resolved to devote more energy and 
resources toward electing candidates who supported the ERA and other fe-
minist positions, and to defeating those who did not.  Reintroducing the 
ERA provided an opportunity to further this goal, highlighting not only how 
the preceding decade had transformed the amendment’s ideological and 
partisan valence, but also how the very enterprise of amendment advocacy 
had evolved into a weapon of political combat.   
A second possible account of ERA II was as a relatively seamless con-
tinuation of the debate over ERA I.  In this account, described in Part I.B, it 
made sense to stand by the amendment’s original legislative history as de-
veloped in the early 1970s, and to stress the abstract principle of equality 
rather than specific legal ramifications and doctrinal innovations.  Despite 
broad agreement that ERA I fell short of promising the fulfillment of femi-
nists’ substantive goals, for some proponents, particularly veterans of the 
first ERA campaign, reinventing the amendment’s meaning seemed politi-
cally futile and even counterproductive.  Soon after the congressional hear-
ings began, though, it became clear that proponents could not avoid probing 
questions about ERA II’s theoretical and doctrinal particularities.  Like it or 
not, the ERA II hearings compelled feminists to rethink their legal priori-
ties.  Despite their ambivalence about the political consequences, feminists 
seized this opportunity to redefine the amendment’s constitutional meaning. 
In the end, feminists created a new constitutional meaning for ERA II 
in dialogue with their opponents.  Like the “de facto ERA” Reva Siegel has 
identified as the product of give-and-take between friends and foes of the 
amendment during the ratification period,11 ERA II as defined by its de-
fenders incorporated some of its opponents’ assumptions as well as its pro-
ponents’ aspirations.  Unlike during the ratification period, though, when 
movement strategy was diffuse and decentralized, the process of construct-
ing a legislative history for the new ERA was relatively deliberate and co-
ordinated.  This focusing of the collective mind proved both an advantage 
and a limitation for feminists.  On the one hand, they presented a relatively 
disciplined, united front in favor of positions that would demonstrably have 
advanced the law beyond its current boundaries.  On the other, political 
considerations still constrained their ability to implement many of the goals 
 
11  Siegel, supra note 8, at 1324.   
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to which they privately—and sometimes publicly—aspired, and determined 
questioning from opponents forced the development of limiting principles 
to rein in revolutionary doctrinal changes.  Proponents’ positions on ERA 
II’s legal consequences almost invariably occupied a middle ground be-
tween feminists’ highest aspirations in 1983 and the meaning of ERA I as 
articulated in the 1971–72 legislative history. 
Part II details the process by which proponents attempted to develop a 
new legislative history for the ERA.  Part II.A briefly describes how the le-
gal landscape of sex equality had changed since congressional passage of 
ERA I.  Part II.B focuses on the controversy over the proper standard of ju-
dicial review under the ERA and the debate over how to address inequality 
that persisted despite the removal of most explicit sex-based classifications 
from the books.  Part II.C looks at the struggle over how ERA II would af-
fect private entities, in light of proponents’ attempts to overcome the stric-
tures of an increasingly conservative state action jurisprudence and 
opponents’ concerns about incursions on the autonomy of private—and es-
pecially religious—institutions.  Part II.D examines the formidable obsta-
cles in the way of feminists’ profound desire to transcend the strategic 
separation of reproductive rights from the ERA without spelling political 
doom for both causes.  Part II.E addresses the substantive and strategic in-
teractions between ERA II and other vehicles of constitutional change. 
The final Part considers the legacies of ERA II.  Part III.A revisits the 
frame of ERA II as political weapon, introduced in Part I.A.  Hoping to cre-
ate momentum for passage—or at least to embarrass conservatives—
proponents forced an up-or-down vote on the amendment in the House, 
which they narrowly lost.  ERA supporters faced criticism from both friend 
and foe for this parliamentary maneuver, but for a brief time it seemed as if 
the amendment’s secondary role as a partisan battering ram might help De-
mocrats and moderate Republicans to exploit the “gender gap.”  Despite a 
short-lived boost from the first female vice-presidential candidacy, how-
ever, the ERA’s career as a political weapon appeared over.   
Nevertheless, the ERA II debate left important legacies for legal femi-
nism and for constitutional amendment advocacy, as described in Part III.B.  
Arguments honed during the hearings became important bases for a new 
feminist constitutional agenda, particularly in the area of disparate impact 
analysis.  Just as importantly, the ERA II controversy drove home the 
shortcomings of constitutional amendment as a means of implementing le-
gal feminist goals.  And the ERA II debate provides an important set of 
sources for scholars seeking to understand what changed—and what re-
mained impervious to change—during one of the most crucial decades in 
the history of American women’s legal status. 
As the Article’s conclusion suggests, the story of ERA II develops sev-
eral themes salient to the literature on constitutional change and social 
103:1223  (2009) A New E.R.A. or a New Era? 
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movement advocacy.12  Most basically, focusing on the (re)introduction of a 
proposed constitutional amendment and the campaign for congressional 
passage highlights the importance of venues other than courts and processes 
other than litigation to the creation and contestation of constitutional mean-
ing.13  The ERA II debate also underscores the significance of amendment 
advocacy even in instances where a proposed Article V amendment is con-
sidered and rejected by Congress.  In keeping with the emerging literature 
on constitutional culture and “democratic constitutionalism,”14 the ERA II 
story emphasizes the extent to which the creation of constitutional meaning 
occurs through a dialogic process, forcing combatants to consider and even 
incorporate the arguments of their opponents into both substantive constitu-
tional interpretation and strategic calculations.15  The ERA II experience 
suggests that amendment advocacy may serve as a weapon of partisan po-
litical combat, as well as a vehicle for rethinking a social movement’s legal 
agenda.16  Finally, ERA II’s role at a transitional moment in the history of 
legal feminism suggests that what appears to be devastating defeat may si-
multaneously liberate a movement’s constitutional imagination. 
I. THREE ACCOUNTS OF ERA II’S PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
After a bruising, decade-long ratification battle, the women’s move-
ment had reached a crossroads.  Back in 1972, when the ERA first passed 
Congress, ratification had seemed, if not assured, altogether likely.  When 
House leaders reintroduced the ERA to the 98th Congress in January 1983, 
feminist leaders knew all too well the magnitude of the obstacles to passage 
and ratification, and they confronted the prospect of a rematch with consid-
erable ambivalence.17  But like it or not, Congress was considering the ERA 
once again.  Faced with the alternative of allowing the amendment’s foes to 
define its meaning, women’s organizations launched a concerted effort to 
coordinate testimony and advocacy for “ERA II.”  But before I examine 
that effort in detail in Part II, in this Part I explore various possible accounts 
of what proponents were doing, or believed themselves to be doing, when 
they launched and executed their campaign for ERA II.   
 
12  For examples of this burgeoning field, see sources cited in Siegel, supra note 8, at 1328 n.13. 
13  A voluminous and growing literature critiques “juricentric” accounts of constitutional meaning.  
My aim in this Article is primarily descriptive: to uncover the rich constitutional contestation that occurs 
in the attempted creation of one proposed constitutional amendment’s legislative history. 
14  Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007). 
15  Siegel, supra note 8. 
16  I have explored elsewhere the mutual influence of constitutional change advocacy and internal 
social movement dynamics.  See Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the His-
torical Dynamics of Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 755 (2004). 
17  BERRY, supra note 7, at 101. 
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A. ERA II as Political Weapon 
For some ERA proponents, most prominently the amendment’s con-
gressional sponsors, ERA II’s primary function was to serve as a political 
battering ram to attack the Reagan Administration and the conservative 
wing of the Republican Party.  For many feminists, this function, although 
not their first priority, provided an important secondary benefit.  After all, 
many women’s rights leaders realized that the ratification failure could be 
reversed only through persuading or defeating ERA critics and antiabortion 
advocates in Congress and the state legislatures.  For those with Democratic 
leanings, Reagan-bashing was comfortable and dovetailed with a general 
political outlook.  For Republican feminists, the President’s opposition to 
the ERA symbolized a larger drift to the social and cultural right that dis-
mayed and demoralized the party’s liberals and moderates.  
When Congress considered the original ERA in 1971 and 1972, the 
amendment had no particular partisan pedigree, and even its ideological va-
lence remained ambiguous.  Some of the amendment’s most ardent sup-
porters had been conservatives like Senator Strom Thurmond, Dixiecrat-
turned-Republican from South Carolina,18 while there was some Democratic 
opposition to the amendment because of the threat it posed to protective la-
bor legislation.  Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) was still a recent 
ERA convert in the early 1970s, as were many in the labor movement.19  
The amendment had the nominal support of the Nixon Administration and 
prominent women in the Administration were avid supporters.  Anti-ERA 
witnesses included Paul Freund, a Harvard law professor with impeccable 
civil rights credentials.20  
Political developments over the next dozen years transformed the ERA 
into a potent symbol of partisan and ideological polarization.21  The Reagan 
Administration and the GOP opposed the amendment outright, while De-
mocratic support for the ERA had become an article of faith, at least at the 
national level.  Indeed, debates over gender roles and over the desirability 
 
18  On alliances between the National Woman’s Party and segregationist Southerners, see, for exam-
ple, LEILA J. RUPP & VERTA TAYLOR, SURVIVAL IN THE DOLDRUMS: THE AMERICAN WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT, 1945 TO THE 1960S (1987); Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and 
the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. HIST. 37 (1983). 
19  On labor opposition to the ERA during the pre-1970s period, see, for example, DOROTHY SUE 
COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN 
AMERICA (2004); CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S ISSUES, 
1945–1968 (1988).   
20  Compare, e.g., Paul A. Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 234 (1971) (arguing against the ERA and in favor of a case-by-case approach to combating sex 
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment), with Paul A. Freund, Civil Rights and the Limits of 
the Law, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 199 (1965) (defending proactive legal approaches to civil rights for African 
Americans). 
21  On the partisan realignment with respect to gender issues generally during this period, see Anne 
N. Costain, After Reagan: New Party Attitudes Toward Gender, 515 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 114 (1991). 
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of sex equality were in no small part responsible for an ongoing partisan re-
alignment that placed cultural issues at the center of political discourse and 
marginalized moderate voices within the Republican Party.  Pundits cred-
ited the newly powerful and visible “Religious Right” with Reagan’s vic-
tory in the 1980 election, and few individuals could take more credit for 
mobilizing grassroots support for religious conservative political activism—
especially among Christian women—than the architect of the STOP ERA 
movement, Phyllis Schlafly.22 
The 1980 election produced another new, much-discussed political 
phenomenon—the electoral “gender gap.”  After decades of voting for De-
mocrats and Republicans in proportions virtually identical to their male 
counterparts, women were turning away from Reagan and the GOP in un-
precedented numbers.23  The gender gap, commentators would later con-
clude, stemmed not so much from differences of opinion on issues like the 
ERA and abortion rights, but rather from concerns about Reagan’s aggres-
sive foreign policy, his prioritization of defense over domestic spending, 
and deep cuts in social programs amidst recession and growing economic 
inequality.  But although later scholarly assessments would undermine the 
theory that Reagan’s opposition to the ERA contributed significantly to the 
gender gap, contemporaneous media accounts gave the idea considerable 
currency.24  Once in office, the Reagan Administration also came under fire 
from civil rights and women’s groups outraged at the Executive Branch’s 
failure to vigorously enforce antidiscrimination laws.  By 1982, Republican 
feminists and moderates were openly breaking with the Administration and 
warning that the party risked permanently losing a crucial voting bloc if it 
continued to antagonize female voters.25   
Women’s organizations like the National Organization for Women 
(NOW) recognized the gender gap as a political opportunity, or at least a 
silver lining on the rapidly gathering clouds of conservatism.26  In the years 
 
22  For more on Schlafly, see DONALD CRITCHLOW, A WOMAN’S CRUSADE: PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY 
AND GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM (2006); CAROL FELSENTHAL, SWEETHEART OF THE SILENT 
MAJORITY (1981); MATHEWS & DE HART, supra note 7. 
23  See sources cited infra notes 24–26. 
24  See, e.g., Steven V. Roberts, Surveys on Women’s Reaction Worry White House, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 1, 1982, at B6; see also sources cited infra note 30.  Political scientist Jane Mansbridge concluded 
that there was little or no evidence that female ERA supporters based their vote on the issue to any 
greater degree than men.  Jane J. Mansbridge, Myth and Reality: The ERA and the Gender Gap in the 
1980 Election, 49 PUB. OPINION Q. 164 (1985). 
In the years since the emergence of the “gender gap,” scholars have advanced various hypotheses to 
explain the phenomenon.  See, e.g., Jeff Manza & Clem Brooks, The Gender Gap in U.S. Presidential 
Elections: When? Why? Implications? 103 AM. J. SOC. 1235 (1998) (examining the impact of labor 
force participation on voting patterns).   
25  See, e.g., Associated Press, Reagan’s Concept of America Hurts Party, Packwood Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 2, 1982, at D22. 
26  Mansbridge gives NOW the lion’s share of the credit for perpetuating the notion that Reagan’s 
opposition to the ERA caused the gender gap.  See Mansbridge, supra note 24, at 166, 171. 
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before the ERA died its official death, women’s groups mounted campaigns 
to defeat anti-ERA state legislators.27  In some instances, female candidates, 
galvanized by the uphill battle for ratification, ran for local and state office 
on a pro-ERA platform.28  When ratification failure appeared certain, ERA 
supporters vowed to reintroduce the amendment and hold legislators ac-
countable for their votes in the 1982 federal and state elections.29  The na-
tional press regularly ran articles emphasizing the electoral gender gap and 
its increasing importance to feminists’ political strategy.30  Even—perhaps 
especially—while in its death throes, the ERA proved a lucrative fundrais-
ing vehicle for organizations like NOW.31  Feminist leaders frankly ac-
knowledged that the large sums raised in the final months of the ratification 
campaign stemmed in large part from women’s growing frustration with the 
Reagan Administration.32  Feminist leaders argued that “[w]ith the backing 
of the proved fund-raising capability, the sharp criticisms of Mr. Reagan by 
women could be easily harnessed to have a major impact on the November 
elections.”33  Columnist Ellen Goodman predicted in early June: 
[E]ven if it fails, the amendment and the activism behind it aren’t going to dis-
appear in a puff of smoke . . . .  These women have learned how the system 
works and how it doesn’t work.  In politics, the slogan is: Don’t get mad, get 
even.  In ERA politics, they know how to do both.34 
To be sure, feminists were divided about the level of energy and re-
sources they should devote to renewing the battle for an ERA, as opposed 
to pursuing their goals through other means.  National Abortion Rights Ac-
tion League director Nanette Falkenberg said on the eve of the ratification 
deadline, “There is a real raging debate . . . over whether the emphasis con-
tinues to go toward ratifying the ERA or whether the focus of activities 
should shift to abortion and other issues.”35  At the local level, many ERA 
activists planned to “shift their energies, for the present, away from a sec-
 
27  See, e.g., John Herbers, Women Turn View to Public Office, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1982, at A1. 
28  Enid Nemy, Feminist Cause Looks Back to Grass Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1982, at B10. 
29  Associated Press, Equal Rights Supporters Plan to Re-Offer Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 
1982, at A16; Beverly Stephen, ERA: The Good Fight Will Continue, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1982, at G3. 
30  See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Women’s Political Habits Show Sharp Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 
1982, at A1; Bill Peterson, Women’s Political Views Shifting, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1982, at G12. 
31  Jane Perlez, NOW’s Funds Soar Suggesting Extent of Women’s Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 
1982, at C1. 
32  Id. (“Mrs. Smeal and other feminist leaders believe that the money coming into NOW for the rati-
fication drive is motivated in part by the far higher negative rating women give President Reagan than 
men give him.”). 
33  Id. 
34  Ellen Goodman, ERA Foes Are Pigging Out on a New ‘Harmony’-to-be, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 
1982, at C5. 
35  Joann S. Lublin, Where Does the Women’s Movement Go Now?, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1982, at 
26. 
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ond ratification campaign toward other fronts.”36  On the other hand, plans 
to reintroduce the ERA proceeded apace.  The New York Times predicted 
that “there will be an E.R.A. II, not because the male and female supporters 
of equal rights are diehards or sore losers but because it is necessary.”37  
Goodman forecasted that feminists would continue to push for an ERA, but 
that it would take at least another decade to achieve success.38  
Over the weeks and months following the first ERA’s expiration, a 
new approach took shape: feminists would continue to support the amend-
ment, but would devote more of their political resources and energies to-
ward financing candidates who would stand up for feminist positions on all 
issues, including the ERA, and toward defeating those who opposed the 
amendment, abortion rights, and other issues of concern to feminists.  When 
ERA supporters officially conceded defeat six days before the ratification 
deadline, NOW President Eleanor Smeal announced at a news conference 
that the organization’s primary goal would be to “chang[e] the composition 
of Congress as well as the state legislatures to include a significantly larger 
proportion of women and of men who are genuinely feminists.”39  NOW 
would devote its fundraising and public relations apparatus to electoral poli-
tics.  Electing more women and sympathetic men, feminists hoped, would 
both stimulate a new ERA ratification drive and promote better policies in 
areas such as child care, domestic violence, economic equality, and repro-
ductive rights.  Smeal foresaw the creation of “an independent third politi-
cal force that will represent women’s interests.”40  She announced in August 
1982 that the organization would mark the anniversary of the Nineteenth 
Amendment with a $3 million fundraising drive to back candidates who 
supported the ERA.41 
Many Democrats and some moderate Republicans proved eager to em-
brace the new ERA.  For members with sympathetic constituencies, signing 
on as a cosponsor was a costless way to curry favor with women’s groups, 
now a force to be reckoned with in American politics, and served as a wel-
come means of embarrassing the Reagan Administration.  Two weeks after 
the first ERA’s defeat, more than two hundred senators and representatives 
reintroduced the amendment, as House Speaker Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill 
(D-MA) and Senator Kennedy trumpeted their commitment to equality be-
 
36  Elsa Brenner, E.R.A. Backers See Challenge in Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1982, at CN1. 
37  Editorial, Equal Rights, the Retail Way, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1982, at A16. 
38  See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Amendment Runs Out of Time: Nothing Can Kill the Idea—It Will Start 
Again, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1982, at C5. 
39  Associated Press, NOW Concedes Defeat on ERA, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1982, at A2. 
40  Lublin, supra note 35. 
41  United Press Int’l, N.O.W. Opens $3 Million Drive for Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1982, at 
A9.  The election of Judy Goldsmith to succeed Smeal signaled, according to Goldsmith, “a very strong 
mandate for a continuation of our electoral, political, and economic direction that we have taken in the 
last year.”  Associated Press, Goldsmith Elected President of NOW, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1982, at B14. 
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fore a crowd of several hundred in front of the Capitol.42  Moderate Senator 
Bob Packwood (R-OR) predicted that his party would lose several House 
seats in the upcoming election and eventually “go out of existence” if the 
GOP continued to “write off 90 percent of minorities and 50 percent of 
women.”43 
Despite some private ambivalence about the wisdom of reintroducing 
the ERA, feminist lawyers publicly reaffirmed the need for a new amend-
ment.  In a lengthy and detailed op-ed published in the Los Angeles Times 
in mid-July, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund Legal Director Phyl-
lis Segal called the ERA “essential” and declared, “The question is not 
‘whether’ the ERA will become part of the Constitution, but ‘when.’”44  A 
supportive editorial ran the next day, opining that “[t]he slate is clean.  The 
backers of the equal rights amendment are starting over.  This time around, 
they must define the issues themselves . . . .”45  Despite her private misgiv-
ings, NOW President Judy Goldsmith enthused, “It’s like the classic ex-
perience when you say, ‘[i]f only I could do that over again and do it right.’  
We have that chance.”46 
Of course, feminists and liberal lawmakers were hardly the only poten-
tial beneficiaries of the ERA’s political fallout.  ERA I had played a signifi-
cant role in mobilizing a previously underappreciated political 
constituency—the conservative Christian women who flocked in large 
 
42  Lynn Rosellini, U.S. Equal Rights Measure Is Re-Introduced in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
1982, at B13. 
43  Id. 
44  Phyllis N. Segal, Women Won’t Be Satisfied with Piecemeal Reform, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1982, 
at E5. 
45  Editorial, “We Are All Equal, That Is All”, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1982, at C4.  Mixed results in the 
1982 elections did not deter those who would link the ERA to the electoral gender gap.  Indeed, NOW 
President Judy Goldsmith attributed NOW’s renewed push for ERA II to feminists’ “extraordinarily 
successful” efforts in the “Remember in November” campaign, an initiative to remind voters of the posi-
tions their legislators had taken on the ERA and encourage them to vote accordingly.  Letter from Judy 
Goldsmith, President, NOW, to NOW Activists (Jan. 1983) (on file with NOW Papers, Schlesinger Li-
brary, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Box 192, Folder 30).  “The groundswell of support [in 
Congress] for ERA re-introduction is unmistakably a tribute to our political effectiveness and to the 
emergence of women as a political force that must be reckoned with,” Goldsmith told supporters in Jan-
uary 1983.  Id. at 1; see also Memorandum from Mary Jean Collins to Goldsmith, Timmer, Webb, and 
Chapman, Reintroduction of the ERA 2 (Jan. 3, 1983) (on file with NOW Papers, Schlesinger Library, 
Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Box 197, Folder 7) (“As you know our public position has been 
cautious on passage this year and to orient our strategy toward the 1984 elections.  It appears that mo-
mentum is being created in Congress because of the 1984 elections and because Democrats are anxious 
to retain the support of women . . . .  Because of the clear positive support we are responding positively 
in the press to the reality of reintroduction.  The 1982 elections showed we remembered in November 
and that women’s political power and candidates’ positions on ERA will be an issue in November 1984 
and other elections prior to that one.”).  As the 98th Congress began its first session that same month, the 
Los Angeles Times editorialized that the second ERA campaign “may be just as difficult as the first, but 
this time around the amendment’s backers are organized and have proved they can punish their oppo-
nents at the polls.”  Editorial, ERA: Those Who Are Wrong, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1983, at C4. 
46  Ellen Goodman, Rules of the Road for a Bumpy ERA Rerun, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 1983, at E5. 
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numbers to Phyllis Schlafly’s STOP ERA movement.  Threatened by femi-
nism’s assault on traditional gender roles and promotion of reproductive 
rights, female workforce participation, and sexual freedom, these women 
adeptly adopted the tactics of their opponents—political organizing, direct 
action, lobbying, public speaking, and direct mailing.  Schlafly and her fol-
lowers helped to foster the rise of grassroots conservatism within the Re-
publican Party.47  Conservative activists publicly professed disgust and 
disbelief at the amendment’s reintroduction, though they could not resist an 
additional opportunity to paint their opponents as radicals bent on destroy-
ing the traditional family, forcing women into military service, providing 
abortion on demand, and promoting homosexuality.48  GOP insiders re-
ported that many Republican senators were loath to be forced to take a posi-
tion on ERA II.49 
However, conservatives in Congress were not without a stake in the 
amendment’s reintroduction.  At the very least, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-
UT), the chairman of the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Con-
stitution, apparently hoped that holding hearings would “make [the ERA] 
controversial so senators feel the heat.”50  Indeed, ERA II arguably provided 
Hatch with an opportunity to lend legitimacy and legal sophistication to an 
opposition movement often accused of hysteria, duplicity, and willful mis-
understanding of the law.  If he could interrogate proponents about the spe-
cific ramifications of the amendment in a calm, rational manner, their real 
agenda would be exposed without so much as a single reference to mur-
dered babies or lesbian conspiracies. 
Thus, political combat was one frame within which participants in the 
ERA II debate viewed their support or opposition.  Of course, that frame 
had very different ramifications for different political actors.  For liberal 
politicians, supporting the amendment was a relatively costless way of shor-
ing up support among an increasingly important constituency and, more-
over, of embarrassing the Reagan Administration and the right wing of the 
Republican Party in advance of the 1984 elections.  For moderates within 
the GOP, support for the ERA was a means of asserting independence from 
a party that increasingly marginalized centrists.  For feminist activists, the 
amendment could serve as a device to smoke out opponents of feminism 
and subject them to retribution at the polls, or at the very least, to raise 
 
47  See CRITCHLOW, supra note 22.   
48  See, e.g., Letter from Jean E. Doyle, National Right to Life Committee (Oct. 27, 1983) (on file 
with NOW Papers, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Box 191, Folder 1); 
Letter from Jerry Falwell to Jennie Thompson (Mar. 8, 1983) (on file with NOW Papers, Schlesinger 
Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Box 175, Folder 14).  When President Reagan con-
sulted with Schlafly in March 1983 to discuss possible approaches to the ERA, she urged him to focus 
on other constitutional priorities, like the human life, school prayer, and balanced budget amendments.  
George Archibald, Hatch to Defy Right on Airing ERA, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1983, at 3A. 
49  Archibald, supra note 48. 
50  Id. 
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money for sympathetic candidates and causes.  For conservatives, the 
ERA’s reintroduction was a potentially dangerous distraction, but also an 
opportunity to showcase their side’s legal sophistication and highlight the 
weaknesses of proponents’ arguments. 
B. ERA II as ERA I, Part II 
Given the temporal continuity of the first ERA ratification campaign 
and the amendment’s immediate reintroduction without textual alteration, it 
is hardly surprising that many feminists—and the scholars who wrote the 
first wave of ERA histories—initially saw the campaign for ERA II as 
merely an extension of the debate over ERA I.  References to the inevitabil-
ity of a decade-long ratification campaign even in the event of successful 
congressional passage made ERA II seem more like a slightly nightmarish 
rerun than a carefully updated remake.  There was considerable continuity 
between the two debates in that many of the issues that were front and cen-
ter with respect to ERA II had arisen during the ERA I ratification cam-
paign, and in that sense were not new.  Rather than reassessing the ERA’s 
meaning in great and reflective detail, it made sense to many proponents to 
stick with their preratification stance—focusing on the principle of equality 
and referring skeptics to the original 1971–72 legislative history when 
pressed for details. 
A number of factors weighed in favor of a strategy characterizing ERA 
II in the abstract, as an important symbolic advance that would have signifi-
cant but not revolutionary effects on women’s legal status.  If ERA support-
ers were to succeed in winning congressional passage of the amendment for 
a second time, it would likely not be through changing legislative minds 
about the substance of the amendment, but rather by convincing members 
of Congress that it was in their political interest to support ERA II—or in 
their political disinterest to oppose it.   
Moreover, the ratification struggle had suggested to proponents that the 
more they could characterize the ERA as a matter of high principle—of 
equality and justice in the abstract—the better.  Public opinion polls indi-
cated that most Americans supported “equality” in these broad terms, but 
inevitably support softened when specific applications of the equality prin-
ciple surfaced, or opponents had the opportunity to characterize the 
amendment’s particular projected effects.51 
Reliance on equality as an abstract principle also made sense as a long-
term strategic matter.  Given that courts were growing increasingly conser-
vative in their interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause,52 the ERA 
might meet a similar fate, at least in the short run.  But if feminists could 
 
51  On the ERA and public opinion, see Serena Mayeri et al., Gender Equality, in PUBLIC OPINION 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily & Jack Citrin eds., 2008). 
52  See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 73–76.  
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achieve greater electoral success and more progressive judicial appoint-
ments, a general guarantee of equality might be more susceptible to expan-
sive interpretation later on.  
Purely pragmatic considerations also supported the characterization of 
ERA II as a replica of ERA I.  Simply put, if ERA I couldn’t win ratifica-
tion, there was little reason to believe that a more ambitious version of the 
amendment would—especially in an increasingly conservative political 
climate.  Further, part of the reason for refusing to give up the ERA ghost 
was a fear that the amendment’s failure would be interpreted as a national 
rejection of the equality principle.  If a large part of the ERA’s continuing 
relevance was as a symbolic affirmation of sex equality and a rejection of 
the antifeminism the amendment helped to foment, then seeing ERA II as 
identical to ERA I made sense. 
Finally, admitting that the ERA would have profound effects on the 
law and on women’s status in American society belied the assurances pro-
ponents had grown accustomed to offering—that the amendment would 
have no effect on abortion, on the rights of homosexual persons, on family 
structure, and so forth.  The “superfluity problem” would not go away—
proponents had to proclaim the continuing need for an ERA despite ad-
vances under the Equal Protection Clause and through legislation.53  Creat-
ing new meanings for ERA II would obviate this problem, but at the 
possibly fatal price of admitting that proponents wanted more than they had 
acknowledged seeking. 
All of these factors militated in favor of resting ERA II on ERA I’s 
original legislative history, enshrined in the 1971 Yale Law Journal article 
coauthored by Thomas Emerson and several feminist law students (the Yale 
ERA Article).54  In this view, ERA II provided a second bite at the ratifica-
tion apple and nothing more.   
C. ERA II as the Dawn of a New Era 
A third way of framing the debate over ERA II was to view it as an 
opportunity to reassess the feminist legal agenda and to rethink the amend-
ment’s constitutional meaning.  This perspective embodied an acute recog-
nition of how much had changed—legally as well as politically—since 
Congress had first considered the ERA.55  Feminists began strategizing 
about how to handle these changes almost immediately after the ERA’s re-
introduction, but it was the congressional hearings themselves that forced 
proponents to redefine the specific legal ramifications of their amendment 
and thereby begin to retool a post-ERA feminist agenda. 
 
53  See Mayeri, supra note 16, at 821; Siegel, supra note 8, at 1403–04. 
54  Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights 
for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971) [hereinafter Yale ERA Article]. 
55  I detail these changes infra at Part II.A. 
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Many feminists were understandably reluctant to wade back into the 
ERA fight.  But once Congress began its hearings, ERA opponents accused 
the amendment’s supporters of evading the true legal ramifications of the 
amendment and forced them to provide detailed assessments of the amend-
ment’s projected legal impact.  What exactly would the judicial standard of 
review be under an ERA?  Precisely which laws would fail to survive judi-
cial scrutiny?  What was the true meaning of “equal rights under the law”?  
To some degree, ERA proponents had faced these questions during the rati-
fication debates, but the context was new—advocates now had the opportu-
nity to rewrite the ERA’s legislative history in light of a decade of legal and 
social change.  Though they steadfastly maintained that an ERA was just as 
necessary as it had been ten years earlier, feminists recognized that they 
faced a transformed legal and political landscape that required them to re-
examine the assumptions, elisions, and compromises of the 1970s. 
When ERA opponents demanded specific answers to specific questions 
about the ERA’s legal meaning, feminist organizations were compelled to 
respond.  This process forced feminists—and feminist lawyers in particu-
lar—to rethink what they wanted from the amendment, and from congres-
sional consideration of the ERA.  The reintroduction of the ERA provided a 
focal point for feminist lawyers to strategize together—to take a cold, hard 
look at the legal landscape, assess their options, and infuse the amendment 
with new legal and political content.  After a decade of asking what they 
could do for the ERA, it was time for feminists to ask what the ERA could 
do for them. 
In attempting to create a new legislative history for the ERA, propo-
nents of the amendment were addressing multiple audiences.  Most imme-
diately, they responded to queries from skeptical or even hostile legislators 
like Senator Orrin Hatch, whose detailed questions were designed to high-
light ambiguities that opponents warned were an invitation to judicial inter-
pretation run amok.56  They also addressed pro-ERA legislators, many of 
whom likely would have preferred to keep the debate at a high level of gen-
erality in order to reap maximum political gain and avoid grappling with the 
difficult doctrinal details.57  A third important audience was internal: femi-
nist lawyers and legal activists frustrated by ERA I’s defeat and by the 
compromises that the ratification effort had required.  Though feminists did 
not necessarily agree on strategy or tactics, many came to see the creation 
of a new legislative history as an opportunity, perhaps even an imperative, 
to reassess their constitutional agenda.  By 1982, the Yale ERA Article’s 
exposition of the amendment’s meaning seemed outdated in its emphasis, if 
 
56  This skepticism was nothing new, of course; Phyllis Schlafly and opponents of ERA I had simi-
larly expressed scorn for the notion that legislative history would constrain judicial interpretation of the 
ERA.  See Siegel, supra note 8, at 1394 (“As a literate member of her constitutional culture, Schlafly did 
not trust legislative history as a constraint on the ERA’s adjudicated meaning . . . .”). 
57  See infra Part II.B.1. 
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not its content.  Feminists who wished for a more expansive ERA II—or 
were forced to clarify the amendment’s meaning by determined questioning 
from skeptics—could not avoid reconstructing its legislative history. 
Finally, the attempted creation of a new legislative history for the 
amendment ultimately anticipated a judicial audience.58  The legislative his-
tory feminists tried to create for ERA II contemplated that courts, when 
called upon to interpret the ERA in future cases, would look to the debates 
and legislative reports they hoped Congress would eventually produce.  
During the debate over ERA I, the Yale ERA Article was widely viewed as 
the definitive exposition of the amendment’s projected impact.59  Although 
the ERA’s opponents exploited fears that courts would not be constrained 
by the amendment’s legislative history, most of the disputants assumed that 
legislative history would play some role in defining the ERA’s scope and 
application to particular problems.  If nothing else, persistent skepticism 
from opponents about the courts’ likely fidelity to legislative history virtu-
ally compelled feminists to provide repeated reassurances that legislative 
history would matter.60 
On this third view, then, the reintroduction of the ERA offered femi-
nists more than a second bite at the ratification apple; it offered them a 
chance to redefine the amendment’s meaning, and feminists seized this op-
portunity.  They engaged in lively debates over how the amendment could 
improve women’s legal status given the sweeping and multivalent changes 
of the 1970s.  However, as they grappled with the questions presented by 
pro- and anti-ERA legislators and with strategic disagreements within their 
own ranks, feminists refined and sometimes scaled back their constitutional 
aspirations.  Thanks to the probing if sometimes disingenuous questions of 
ERA skeptics and supporters, feminists were compelled to think carefully 
about doctrinal intricacies they had preferred to leave vague during the rati-
fication period.  In the end, the legal meaning of ERA II was the evolving 
product of a series of compromises.  Those compromises reflected external 
pressures from ERA opponents and legislators, as well as internal dis-
agreements about how much a constitutional amendment could accomplish 
 
58  As William Eskridge put it, “Both legislative history and constitutional history are strategic: 
players make statements with an eye on how other people will respond to them.  In this century, legisla-
tive history has become strategic in another way: players make statements with an eye on how judges 
will construe their statutes.”  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist 
but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1302–03 (1998).   
59  Mansbridge questions the accuracy of this assumption.  See Mansbridge, supra note 24, at 250–
52. 
60  For a contemporaneous account of how the Supreme Court treated legislative history in the con-
text of statutory interpretation in the early 1980s, see Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use 
of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 195 (1983) (“The Su-
preme Court increasingly is using legislative history in construing and applying federal statutes.”).  Dur-
ing this period, constitutional scholars and government officials were also engaging in an increasingly 
heated debate over “originalism” in constitutional interpretation.  See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE 
CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 132–63 (1996).   
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and about the role that the ERA should play in women’s rights advocacy af-
ter the ratification failure. 
II. REDEFINING “EQUALITY OF RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW” 
This Part recounts how feminists created a new constitutional meaning 
for the ERA through combative dialogue with their opponents.  It quickly 
became clear that opponents would not allow feminists to promote the ERA 
as an abstract guarantee of equality, but rather would force them to account 
for the amendment’s concrete effects on law and jurisprudence.  Neverthe-
less, feminists struggled with competing impulses as they contemplated 
what kind of legislative history to create for ERA II.  One possibility was to 
continue to emphasize equality as an abstract principle, and when pressed 
for details, stick with the positions taken in the first round of congressional 
deliberations in 1971 and 1972, the option suggested above by Part I.B.  
This position did not reflect satisfaction with the original legislative history, 
but rather a belief that the ERA was not a capacious enough receptacle for 
feminists’ legal and constitutional aspirations.  In other words, this was a 
conservative position not on the merits, but on the strategic questions pro-
ponents faced.  The competing impulse, suggested by Part I.C, came from a 
kind of ratification fatigue—a weariness of the endless compromises en-
tailed by amendment advocacy and an eagerness to move beyond the con-
straints imposed by the debate over ERA I.  According to this view, 
drawing artificial lines between abortion and constitutional sex equality, for 
example, was counterproductive and ultimately injurious to the causes of 
reproductive rights and feminism.  Focusing on the harm of explicit sex-
based classifications made little sense in a world where most of these dis-
tinctions had been wiped off the books and yet sex-based inequality per-
sisted.  Ultimately, a new constitutional meaning for ERA II emerged out of 
these warring impulses. 
A. The Legal Backdrop: A Decade of Change 
Much had changed since the debates over congressional passage of the 
ERA in 1971 and 1972.  At the federal level, feminist lawyers had per-
suaded the Supreme Court to scrutinize and invalidate many sex discrimina-
tory laws.61  Statutes like Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978 provided the basis for lawsuits against private as well as public em-
ployers who discriminated on the basis of sex.  Title IX forbade many 
forms of sex discrimination in education.  At the state level, an examination 
of laws and policies that disadvantaged women was well under way, some-
times compelled by state constitutional changes—most prominently, state 
 
61  See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 419 U.S. 636 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
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ERAs.62  The numbers of women pursuing traditionally male occupations, 
including law, medicine, and even military service, increased steadily.63  As 
scholars of the ERA’s failure recognize, these victories made arguing for 
the amendment more difficult in the latter years of the ratification process.64  
Changes in the law—both statutory and judge-made—between 1972 and 
1982 removed many of the sex-based legal distinctions that the ERA origi-
nally was designed to vanquish.  Political scientist Jane Mansbridge argued 
just a few years later that by the time the ERA officially expired, the 
amendment’s direct, short-term impact probably would have been limited.65  
The reigning consensus within the legal academy today is that equal protec-
tion jurisprudence more or less incorporated ERA I’s precepts, and this in-
terpretation earned now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s blessing in the late 
1990s.66 
To say that by 1982 feminists had achieved through other means much 
of what the ERA was designed to accomplish is not to assert that feminists 
were satisfied with the legal changes they had won, however—far from it.  
In fact, the developments of the 1970s and early 1980s had themselves 
transformed the meaning of equality for advocates concerned with women’s 
legal status.  In the first hearings on the amendment in 1971 and 1972, ex-
plicit sex-based classifications that limited women’s ability to break out of 
traditional roles topped women’s rights advocates’ list of grievances.67  
Now the crucial difference an ERA could make concerned the treatment of 
sex-neutral laws that disproportionately disadvantaged women.68  In 1971 
and 1972, the Supreme Court had only just begun to reconsider its tradi-
tionally deferential rational basis standard for reviewing sex-based classifi-
cations; by the early 1980s, the Court had struck down many sex-specific 
laws69 and established a more rigorous standard of review: intermediate 
 
62  For a comprehensive list of state ERAs and sex-based equal protection provisions, see LESLIE W. 
GLADSTONE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RS20217, EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENTS: STATE 
PROVISIONS (2004), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-7397:1. 
63  See Serena Mayeri, Women: United States Law, in OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 
(forthcoming) (on file with author). 
64  BERRY, supra note 7, at 99–100; MANSBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 45–59. 
65  MANSBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 141–43. 
66  Siegel, supra note 8, at 1334.  
67  See, e.g., Yale ERA Article, supra note 54, at 873 (“Our legal structure will continue to support 
and command an inferior status for women so long as it permits any differentiation in legal treatment on 
the basis of sex.”).   
68  The Yale ERA Article did recognize, in passing, the possibility that sex-neutral “functional” clas-
sifications “may in practice fall more heavily on one sex than the other.”  Id. at 898.  After observing 
that the courts had confronted similar problems in the areas of racial and religious discrimination, the 
authors suggested that “[p]rotection against indirect, covert or unconscious sex discrimination is essen-
tial to supplement the absolute ban on explicit sex classification of the Equal Rights Amendment . . . .  
The courts will have to maintain a strict scrutiny of such classifications if the guarantees of the Amend-
ment are to be effectively secured.”  Id. at 900. 
69  See, e.g., cases cited supra note 61.  
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scrutiny.70  Whereas the ERA’s effect on affirmative action had not been a 
prominent concern in the early 1970s, heated controversies over race-based 
remedies and the nebulous constitutional status of sex-based affirmative ac-
tion increased the issue’s salience.71  Abortion had played only a minor role 
in the first set of hearings; however, a decade after Roe v. Wade,72 it was a 
primary preoccupation of American politics.  In the early 1970s, predictions 
that an ERA would lead to same-sex marriage could be dismissed as ab-
surd; by 1983 they no longer seemed quite so outlandish.   
At the same time that they had succeeded in eliminating many of the 
overtly sex discriminatory laws that had been the original targets of ERA I, 
feminists’ success had certain limitations.  Most prominently, the Supreme 
Court had declared that discrimination based on pregnancy did not neces-
sarily constitute discrimination based on sex in violation of the equal pro-
tection guarantee;73 that the Equal Protection Clause did not require that 
women and men be treated equally with respect to draft registration74 or sta-
tutory rape laws;75 that a strong showing of discriminatory intent was neces-
sary to establish an equal protection violation even if a law exerted a 
dramatically disproportionate impact on women;76 and that federal and state 
governments could deny funding for abortion services without running 
afoul of the Constitution.77  
As a practical matter, the changes feminists did achieve meant that the 
overtly sex-based legal distinctions that remained on the books were often 
the most entrenched and emotion-laden—restrictions on women’s participa-
tion in military service, including the exclusion of women from the draft 
and from combat; laws that defined marriage as a union between a man and 
a woman; and certain forms of sex separation, such as single-sex athletic 
teams, sex education classes, prisons, dormitories, and restrooms.  As histo-
rians of the ERA ratification controversy have explicated, these issues 
played starring roles in the playbooks of ERA opponents.  With the most 
frightening specters of androgyny and sexual license looming, and many—
though certainly not all—of the ERA’s original targets vanquished, making 
 
70  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
71  The Yale ERA Article touched briefly on the subject of affirmative action.  Presumably con-
cerned that compensatory rationales would be used to uphold laws that differentiated between men and 
women to women’s actual detriment, the authors struck a careful and somewhat cryptic balance between 
supporting the courts’ “power to grant affirmative relief in framing decrees in particular cases,” and dis-
avowing an approach that would accord the same degree of deference to “compensatory aid” to women 
as to racial minorities.  See Yale ERA Article, supra note 54, at 903–04. 
72  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
73  Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
74  Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
75  Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County., 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
76  Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
77  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 
432 U.S. 438 (1977). 
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a compelling argument that the ERA remained necessary and desirable all 
but required a fresh account of the ERA’s legal impact.   
The ratification debates had not been an auspicious time for calm de-
liberation over the amendment’s legal ramifications, however.  Debates 
over ratification became highly symbolic and focused on inflammatory so-
cial issues such as the military draft, abortion, the projected demise of the 
traditional family, and homosexuality.  ERA proponents lacked the centrali-
zation and organizational discipline of Schlafly’s STOP ERA movement.  
They often found themselves in a defensive posture, compelled to spend 
much of their time describing what the ERA would not do rather than the 
positive changes it would bring.  When proponents did attempt to invoke 
the ERA’s legislative history to assuage the concerns of skeptics, they were 
constrained to referring back to the 1971 and 1972 congressional debates, 
which seemed increasingly distant now that judicial and legislative action 
had addressed many of the discriminations ERA promoters identified in the 
first place.78  Once the ERA had gone down in defeat, though, feminists 
were at least partially liberated from these constraints.  Now they could at-
tempt a deliberate, coordinated reassessment of their legal agenda.  In ef-
fect, they redefined the ERA to encompass many—though not all—of the 
goals that had evolved out of the legal and political changes of the 1970s 
and early 1980s.  In the end, though, they could not wholly escape the po-
litical constraints that made the first ratification campaign so difficult, par-
ticularly once opponents interrogated them about the specific legal and 
doctrinal ramifications of ERA II.79 
B. “Equality in Theory” or “Equality in Fact”? 
The hallmark of ERA II as constructed by a coalition of feminist law-
yers and women’s organizations was a definition of discrimination that em-
phasized the central role played by sex-neutral laws in the perpetuation of 
 
78  The Yale ERA Article devoted the majority of its attention to the issues that generated the most 
debate and controversy in 1970–71: the fate of protective labor legislation, changes in domestic relations 
and criminal law, and the amendment’s effect on military service.  See Yale ERA Article, supra note 54, 
at 920–78. 
79  The fact that ERA II’s text was identical to that of ERA I could have been a constraint on propo-
nents’ ability to create a new legislative history for the measure, but it does not appear to have been per-
ceived as such by most proponents.  Opponents sometimes resisted proponents’ attempts to recast the 
amendment.  See, e.g., Equal Rights Amendment: Hearings on H.J. Res. 1 Before the Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 798 (1983) [hereinafter House 
Hearings].  At least one witness, late in the hearings, opined that the “absolute” wording of the amend-
ment would have consequences unintended by proponents and at odds with their objectives.  Catherine 
Zuckert, a political scientist at Carleton College, testified that she was concerned that the ERA would 
make affirmative action for women unconstitutional and would reaffirm rather than contravene the nar-
row definition of sex discrimination expressed in cases like Geduldig.  See The Impact of the Equal 
Rights Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 10 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, Part 2, 98th Cong. 102–15 (1984) [hereinafter Senate Hearings, Part II] (testimony of 
Catherine H. Zuckert). 
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women’s inferior legal, economic, and social status.  In other words, femi-
nists argued that the amendment would allow constitutional disparate im-
pact challenges to laws that did not distinguish between men and women on 
their face, but that nevertheless had a sex-based disproportionate effect.  
The emergence of disparate impact analysis in the debate over ERA II un-
derscored both the victories and the limitations of the legal changes that the 
civil rights and women’s rights movements had secured during the 1970s.  
The disparate impact question had not been prominent in the first congres-
sional consideration of the ERA in part because overt sex-based classifica-
tions were numerous enough that they were the amendment’s primary 
targets.  Further, in the early 1970s the door was still open to an expansive 
definition of actionable disparate impact under the Equal Protection Clause.  
Not long after the ERA’s passage, feminists began to challenge veterans’ 
preference laws using an equal protection theory that minimized the role of 
discriminatory intent and explicit sex classification.  Washington v. Davis,80 
in 1976, was the first case in which the Supreme Court defined discrimina-
tory intent as the key element of equal protection violation.  Even in the 
wake of Davis, feminists won victories against some of the more extreme 
veterans’ preference schemes in the lower courts.81  It was not until Person-
nel Administrator v. Feeney, in 1979, that the Court appeared to virtually 
foreclose successful sex-based disparate impact challenges under the Equal 
Protection Clause.82  Thus, only toward the end of the 1970s did it become 
clear to feminists that they would have to look outside of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause—perhaps to the ERA—to combat disparate impact under the 
federal Constitution. 
By 1983, then, conditions were ripe for feminists to redefine the nature 
of equality under the ERA.  Feminists did not always advertise this trans-
formation, but they did not back away from it either.  In contrast to their 
continued denials that the ERA would implicate abortion funding bans or 
laws concerning homosexuality, proponents acknowledged—and at times 
even emphasized—that the new ERA would call facially neutral laws into 
question.  The challenge for feminist lawyers was to define a legal standard 
sufficiently rigorous to eliminate laws that perpetuated women’s subordi-
nate status but limited enough to assuage concerns that a constitutional as-
sault on facially neutral laws would subject virtually every state and federal 
legislative act to judicial scrutiny. 
1. “At Least Six Different ERAs”: The Standard of Review Contro-
versy.—The standard of review that judges would apply under the ERA be-
came a focus of congressional scrutiny almost as soon as Senate hearings 
 
80  426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
81  See Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978) (striking down veterans’ prefer-
ence on remand for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis). 
82  442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
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on the amendment began in May 1983.  The ERA’s primary Senate spon-
sor, Paul E. Tsongas (D-MA), was the first to testify before the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution, chaired by 
conservative Senator Orrin Hatch.  Tsongas cast his prepared statement in 
general terms, attempting to allay concerns that the ERA would require the 
sex-integration of restrooms and prisons, force women into combat posi-
tions for which they were unqualified, and coerce homemakers into the 
workforce on pain of financial ruin.  The very first question posed to a wit-
ness in the ERA II hearings was Hatch’s query to Tsongas: “What pre-
cisely, in your view, is the standard of review that the equal rights 
amendment would establish for Federal and State legislation that employ 
sex classifications?”83  But Tsongas declined to delve deeply into the legal 
intricacies of the amendment.  “There is no one who would argue that we 
have at this point an exact understanding of where it will lead,” he said at 
one point in the exchange.84  When Hatch then asked whether Tsongas 
agreed that the analysis set out in the Yale ERA Article remained the “de-
finitive statement” on the amendment’s meaning,85 Tsongas said he had not 
read the article.86  Hatch followed up with a litany of specific questions 
about the ERA’s projected legal impact on everything from abortion fund-
ing, to veterans’ preferences, to seniority systems, to single sex schools, to 
maternity leave, to combat restrictions, to the legality of same-sex marriage.  
Tsongas dodged them all, emphasizing that all constitutional amendments 
contained some ambiguities and suggesting that Hatch had not subjected his 
own proposed human life (antiabortion) amendment to such a rigorous 
standard of certainty.87  The exchange grew heated.  “You knew damn well 
that these are specific issues, that no one coming here unprepared could an-
swer,” Tsongas shot back at one point.88  The Associated Press described 
Tsongas as “visibly shaken.”89  Though he continued to accuse Hatch of hy-
pocrisy, Tsongas agreed to submit a detailed list of answers to Hatch’s 
questions.   
Thus, in the first hour of the first hearing, Hatch had both established 
the agenda for the remaining hearings and created the impression that the 
amendment’s proponents were long on platitudes and short on specifics.  
Even some ERA sympathizers were aghast at Tsongas’s apparent inability 
 
83  The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 10 Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 98th Cong. 22 (1983) [hereinafter Senate 
Hearings, Part I].   
84  Id. at 22. 
85  Id. at 23. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. at 23–31. 
88  Associated Press, Two Senators in Hot Discussion on Equal Rights Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 27, 1983, at A11. 
89  Id. 
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to answer basic questions about the amendment’s meaning.90  It had become 
painfully clear that ERA supporters faced a well-informed, legally sophisti-
cated adversary and would be forced to articulate much more specifically 
the amendment’s constitutional consequences. 
Although Hatch’s portrayal of the proponents’ views as ambiguous at 
best and evasive at worst was somewhat unfair, his professed confusion 
over the standard of review that would apply under the ERA was not wholly 
unreasonable.  The ERA’s text itself did not specify a standard of review, 
stating only that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.”  The 1971 
Yale ERA Article, which the Amendment’s supporters and opponents fre-
quently cited as the most reliable predictor of the ERA’s impact, had set 
forth an “absolute” standard, subject to three “qualifications,” sometimes 
referred to colloquially as “exceptions.”  If courts followed the Yale Arti-
cle’s schema, laws that distinguished between individuals on the basis of 
sex would be absolutely prohibited except (1) where they involved a physi-
cal characteristic unique to one sex;91 (2) where they were necessary to pre-
serve other constitutional rights, such as the right of personal privacy;92 or 
(3) where they were part of a genuine affirmative action policy designed to 
remedy past discrimination.93  In each of these three exceptional instances, 
the classificatory law would be subject to strict scrutiny: the requirement 
that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling govern-
ment interest.94  
Frequently, however, during and after the ratification debates, both 
friends and foes of the ERA characterized the applicable standard of review 
as analogous to the standard applied to race-based classifications: strict 
scrutiny.  The analogy to race generally, and strict scrutiny in particular, 
served as a kind of shorthand in part because strict scrutiny was usually, but 
not always, fatal to the challenged law.  Similarly, the Yale ERA Article 
announced an absolute standard that in fact was subject to certain excep-
tions.95   
Nevertheless, there were potentially significant substantive and sym-
bolic differences between the absolute standard and a general application of 
 
90  See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 46 (describing Tsongas as “shamefully unprepared” for his ex-
change with Hatch); Editorial, Tsongas and the ERA, BOSTON GLOBE, June 4, 1983, at 14 (criticizing 
Tsongas for “showing up unprepared”).  But see Letter from Paul Tsongas to the Editor, Boston Globe 
(June 1983) (on file with NOW Papers, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, 
Box 191, Folder 45) (defending his own testimony, including his decisions to defer technical questions 
to constitutional lawyers and to admit that courts would exert some control over the interpretation of the 
ERA). 
91  Yale ERA Article, supra note 54, at 893–95. 
92  Id. at 900–02. 
93  Id. at 903–05; see also discussion supra note 71. 
94  Yale ERA Article, supra note 54, at 888–909.  
95  Id.  
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strict scrutiny to all sex-based classifications.  An absolute standard created 
a bright-line rule for a certain category of classifications that did not fall 
under any of the three exceptions.  Strict scrutiny at least theoretically left 
open the possibility that any sex-based classification might be upheld if the 
government’s asserted objective was sufficiently compelling and the means 
used to achieve that goal were necessary.96  Moreover, the absolute standard 
carried particular symbolic weight because proponents perceived it to be 
even more stringent than the standard applied to race-based classifications, 
indicating to proponents a laudable seriousness about the gravity of sex dis-
crimination missing from the Supreme Court’s intermediate scrutiny formu-
lation. 
Opponents framed the absolute standard as epitomizing the ERA’s in-
flexibility and its supporters’ fanatical devotion to androgyny.97  It was bad 
enough that many proponents asserted that the ERA would treat sex like 
race—to apply an even higher level of scrutiny added insult to injury.  ERA 
skeptics also chided proponents for failing to specify which standard of re-
view would apply.  After Tsongas and the second pro-ERA witness, attor-
ney Marna Tucker, attempted to gloss over the issue, anti-ERA witness 
Walter Berns of the American Enterprise Institute complained that “[w]hat 
this [vagueness about the standard of review] implies is that it is not neces-
sary to know what the language means because in due course the courts will 
tell us what it means.”98  To leave something this important up to the courts, 
Berns charged, was to “treat[] the Constitution with contempt.”99  The first 
House hearing on ERA II, several weeks later, revealed continued confu-
sion over the proper standard of review for sex-based classifications.  Anti-
ERA witness Grover Rees III, a professor at the University of Texas Law 
School, opined that this ambiguity produced so many different possible in-
terpretations that there were, in effect, “at least six different ERAs.”100  The 
U.S. Civil Rights Commissioner and Howard University Professor Mary 
Frances Berry immediately followed Rees and offered a definitive answer 
 
96  As the Yale ERA Article’s authors wrote: 
The suspect classification test provides a potential basis for more comprehensive protection 
against sex discrimination; under its operation, sex-based classifications would be considered 
“suspect” and subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.  But because this doctrine allows the govern-
ment to justify even a suspect classification by “compelling reasons,” it would permit some classi-
fications based on sex to survive.  Thus this standard too would not guarantee an effective system 
of equality which, as we shall argue, demands the elimination of all such classifications. 
Id. at 880–81 (footnote omitted). 
97  See, e.g., MATHEWS & DE HART, supra note 7, at 167–68, 220. 
98  Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 63 (prepared statement of Walter Berns, Resident 
Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Professional Lecturer, Georgetown University). 
99  Id.  As Mary Frances Berry has observed, “An underlying aspect of the committee hearings and 
the debate on the floor was a deep distrust of the role of federal courts in the American system of gov-
ernment . . . .”  BERRY, supra note 7, at 108. 
100  House Hearings, supra note 79, at 28–30 (statement of Grover Rees III, Assistant Professor of 
Law, University of Texas School of Law). 
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to the standard of review question.  In response to a question from Repre-
sentative Mike DeWine (R-OH), Berry testified that the standard would be 
analogous to that applied to race-based classifications under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.101  
Subsequent hearings in the House picked up on both the parallel to the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the apparent inconsistencies in proponents’ tes-
timonies about the proper standard of review.  Phyllis Schlafly told the 
House subcommittee on October 20, “To predict what will be the effect of 
ERA in any area, just ask yourself, ‘how do we handle it in race?’ and you 
will have the answer.”102  During the same hearing, former Representative 
Charles Wiggins emphasized the importance of conclusively establishing 
the standard of review, arguing that if Congress did not wish to embrace the 
decisional law on race-based classifications, it should incorporate specific 
exceptions into the committee reports and other legislative history.103  Rep-
resentative DeWine expressed frustration with pro-ERA witnesses’ reluc-
tance to clarify definitively the proper standard of review.  Many of the 
witnesses had deferred such questions, leaving them to others with greater 
expertise in matters of constitutional doctrine.  Said DeWine, “I just hope 
that someday we get some witnesses in here, Mr. Chairman, with all due re-
spect, who will talk about what the interpretation will be by the courts and 
what the test [will be].  That is the tough question.”104   
The chairman of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional 
Rights, Representative Don Edwards (D-CA), complied at a hearing one 
week later, calling as witnesses constitutional scholars Thomas Emerson of 
Yale and Ann Freedman of Rutgers.  Emerson and Freedman were among 
the five coauthors of the famous Yale ERA Article, and their testimony did 
serve to clarify ERA proponents’ position on the proper standard of review 
for sex-based classifications.  Emerson eschewed the label “absolute,” not-
ing that it had acquired “pejorative” connotations during the ERA ratifica-
tion debates.105  But Emerson essentially reaffirmed the Yale ERA Article’s 
general prohibition on facial sex classifications that did not fall under the 
three exceptions—narrowly drawn affirmative action programs, unique 
 
101  Id. at 52 (statement of Mary Frances Berry, Commissioner, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights). 
102  Id. at 409–10 (statement of Phyllis Schlafly). 
103  Id. at 384 (statement of Charles Wiggins).  In the next House hearing six days later, Columbia 
Law Professor Henry Paul Monaghan, a professed ERA sympathizer testifying on behalf of the anti-
ERA Orthodox Jewish organization Agudath Israel, pointed out that while both the absolute and the 
strict scrutiny standards “will lead to the same result in the vast majority of cases involving gender-
based classifications—namely, invalidation . . . the standards are not in principle identical.”  Allowing 
some explicitly sex-based laws and policies to stand if they served a compelling government interest 
would, for example, leave more room for gender differentiation in the military and combat settings.  Id. 
at 640–41 (statement of Henry Paul Monaghan, Thomas M. Macioce Professor of Law, Columbia Uni-
versity). 
104  Id. at 593 (statement of Representative Mike DeWine). 
105  Id. at 797 (statement of Thomas Emerson). 
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physical characteristics, and conflicts with other constitutional provisions, 
such as the right to privacy.106   
But what was noteworthy about Emerson’s and Freedman’s testimony 
before the House subcommittee was not so much their explication of the 
appropriate standard of review for overt sex-based classifications, which in 
practical terms had arguably become a distinction without a difference.107  
Instead, by this point in the hearings it was clear that the most important 
question about standards of review concerned not legal classifications ex-
plicitly based on sex, but rather sex-neutral laws and policies that had a sex-
based disproportionate effect.   
2. A “Theoretical Dilemma”: Disparate Impact Analysis and the 
New ERA.—Feminist lawyers and activists immediately identified disparate 
impact as one of the key issues they would need to address as they at-
tempted to shape ERA II’s legislative history.  “Disparate impact theory” 
had been one of several areas “for further research” identified in March 
1983 at a meeting for representatives of a coalition of feminist groups, in-
cluding Eleanor Smeal, Judy Goldsmith, Catherine East, Phyllis Segal, and 
Marsha Levick.108  Segal, an attorney with NOW Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund (LDEF), was charged with writing an initial memo laying out the 
substantive and strategic issues involved.  The threshold question, Segal re-
alized, was whether ERA proponents should attempt to clarify the applica-
tion of the amendment to sex-neutral laws that had a disproportionately 
negative sex-based effect, or whether they should remain silent on the sub-
ject and leave ERA I’s sparse legislative history on the issue to speak for 
them.109  In her memo, Segal laid out three options: doing nothing; “act[ing] 
 
106  Id. at 736–39 (statement of Thomas Emerson). 
107  As NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund attorney Marsha Levick wrote to her colleagues: 
“[P]ractically speaking ‘strict scrutiny’ versus ‘absolute’ standard may be academic, if court has struck 
down every explicit racial classification since Brown v. Bd. of Ed.”  Memorandum from Marsha Levick 
to NOW-NOW LDEF ERA Legislative History Committee (May 1983) (on file with Schlesinger Li-
brary, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, Box 23, Folder 32); see also Sen-
ate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 519 (testimony of Ann Freedman, Associate Professor of Law, 
Rutgers Law School).  
108  Memorandum from Marsha Levick to Ellie Smeal, Judy Goldsmith, John Vanderstar, Mary Jean 
Collins, Catherine East, and Phyllis Segal, Re: Federal ERA—Legislative History Project (Mar. 22, 
1983) (on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).  Each of these areas—
disparate impact theory, affirmative action, unique physical characteristics, reproductive rights, home-
makers’ rights, and the state action doctrine—were both politically sensitive and technically complex.  
109  Memorandum from Phyllis Segal to ERA Legislative History Project (Mar. 21, 1983) (on file 
with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, Box 23, Folder 
29).  The Yale ERA Article had spoken briefly to the issue: 
Protection against indirect, covert or unconscious sex discrimination is essential to supplement the 
absolute ban on explicit sex classification of the Equal Rights Amendment.  Past discrimination in 
education, training, economic status and other areas has created differences which could readily be 
seized upon to perpetuate discrimination under the guise of functional classifications.  The courts 
will have to maintain a strict scrutiny of such classifications if the guarantees of the Amendment 
are to be effectively secured. 
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halfway by stressing disparate impact problems in describing the need for 
the ERA, without offering comments on the theoretical application or effect 
of the ERA in such cases”; and “present[ing] direct argument on this.”110  
Avoiding the issue could backfire, she suggested, by limiting the ERA’s 
“potential as a legal tool.”  Without further legislative history, there was a 
“serious risk that the Supreme Court will not apply the ERA to disparate 
impact cases, or will import an intent requirement” from equal protection 
jurisprudence.111  Focusing exclusively on facial sex-based classifications 
also ran the risk of “trivializ[ing] the problems of sex discrimination,” given 
“the dwindling list of laws that discriminate on their face.”112  It would be 
difficult to explain why the Equal Protection Clause did not suffice to ad-
dress sex discrimination, unless the ERA would go significantly further 
than the Fourteenth Amendment in resolving disparate impact cases.113  Put-
ting the argument in more positive terms, Segal predicted that “expanding 
the impact of the ERA will increase support.”114  
Finally, Segal recognized that avoiding the issue was unrealistic: 
“Even if proponents don’t focus [on] the issue [of disparate impact], a smart 
‘undecided’ legislator, or opponents, will.”115  As if to prove Segal’s point, 
Hatch raised the subject in the first Senate hearing on ERA II, asking Marna 
Tucker whether “disparate impact analysis” would apply to the ERA.116  
Tucker demurred, saying that she had not studied the issue.117  Feminist 
lawyers realized they would have to be more forthcoming, but sought to 
strike a balance between explication and obfuscation.  As feminist legal 
strategists discussed how to respond to the questions raised by Hatch in the 
first hearing, they established a “format for answering” questions about dis-
parate impact: “1. Ask for specificity in question: what exactly is the ques-
tioner asking re: ERA and specific issue raised.  2. Preface answer with 
description of disparate impact this particular classification/issue has on 
women.”118  Proponents would emphasize the discrimination the ERA was 
meant to eradicate, and only address the legal technicalities of disparate im-
pact analysis if pressed further.   
                                                                                                                           
Yale ERA Article, supra note 54, at 900.  Segal wrote: “While this article is an important part of the 
ERA legislative history . . . I am not aware of this particular passage being discussed.”  Memorandum 
from Phyllis Segal to ERA Legislative History Project, supra, at 6. 
110  Memorandum from Phyllis Segal to ERA Legislative History Project, supra note 109, at 9–11. 
111  Id. at 10. 
112  Id.  
113  Id. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 67 (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch). 
117  Id. at 70 (statement of Marna Tucker). 
118  Memorandum from Marsha Levick to NOW-NOW LDEF ERA Legislative History Committee, 
supra note 107, at 1–2. 
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a. The search for a limiting principle.—As the feminist lawyers 
constructed their strategy for responding to questions, they began to con-
front some of the challenges of articulating a theory of disparate impact that 
would reach the discrimination they wished to vanquish without appearing 
to be a radical and unworkable judicial intrusion on legislative decision-
making.  Because the range of laws exerting a sex-based disparate impact 
seemed potentially infinite, establishing a workable limiting principle was 
perhaps the most daunting challenge ERA proponents faced in formulating 
a method of disparate impact analysis.   
The starting point for constitutional disparate impact analysis was the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of such cases under the Equal Protection Clause.  
A finding of discriminatory intent was the primary limiting principle estab-
lished by the Court in Davis and Feeney.  Disparate impact alone would not 
trigger heightened scrutiny absent evidence of discriminatory intent, ac-
cording to Davis.119  Feminist lawyers had long emphasized that as difficult 
as it was to prove discriminatory intent in the context of racial discrimina-
tion, it was virtually impossible to find such evidence in cases of sex dis-
crimination.120  Yet the Court had in fact raised the bar even higher for sex-
based disparate impact claims in Feeney.  The majority in Feeney effec-
tively rejected the more nuanced analysis of Davis in favor of a requirement 
that, for a claim to succeed, the challenged law must have been enacted 
“because of,” not just “in spite of” its adverse impact on women.  Even the 
dissenters in Feeney had not moved all that far away from an intent-based 
inquiry.121  Justice Marshall wrote for himself and Justice Brennan that 
Massachusetts’s absolute veterans’ preference “evinces purposeful gender-
based discrimination,” and applied heightened scrutiny to the policy on that 
basis.122  “[T]he critical constitutional inquiry is not whether an illicit con-
sideration was the primary or but-for cause of a decision, but rather whether 
it had an appreciable role in shaping a given legislative enactment,” Mar-
shall opined, finding that among other factors, the “foreseeability” of the 
drastically adverse impact on women provided sufficient evidence of dis-
criminatory purpose to trigger suspicion.123 
This “foreseeability” standard thus provided one possible limiting 
principle that was less drastic than the Feeney majority’s analysis.  ERA 
proponents felt, however, that this standard still conceded too much to the 
preoccupation with intent that characterized the Court’s equal protection 
analysis.  From the start, their objective was to eliminate the intent require-
 
119  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
120  I address feminists’ arguments to this effect in the Feeney case in greater depth elsewhere.  See 
SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: LEGAL FEMINISM IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (Harvard Univ. 
Press, forthcoming). 
121  Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281–82 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
122  Id. 
123  Id. at 282–83.   
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ment altogether.  Intent was far from irrelevant, feminists stressed, but they 
sought to ensure that evidence of a discriminatory purpose would be suffi-
cient, rather than necessary, to trigger heightened scrutiny.  Segal declared 
in her March 1983 memo: “While purpose or intent to discriminate would 
be definitive evidence to invalidate governmental action that has a disparate 
impact on females (or males), such evidence is not required (as it is in 
[equal protection] cases).  This is the point that has not been articulated be-
fore.”124  Most laws that had a disparate impact on women were not the 
product of deliberate malice, feminists argued, but of subtle attitudes and 
entrenched stereotypes about gender roles that exhibited the same constitu-
tional infirmities as laws that overtly classified men and women.  As Segal 
put it, “many rules that appear ‘neutral’ are designed essentially on world-
view assumptions such as male wage worker/female childbearer-rearer role 
distinctions.”125  Legal rules, moreover, often were “built on male norms,” 
but the “process of designing such ‘male-centered’ rules rarely includes—
and more rarely provides evidence of—overt discriminatory intent.”126 
But if feminists were unwilling to include an intent requirement—even 
in the more relaxed register of “foreseeability”—then they lacked a princi-
ple by which to limit the applicability of disparate impact analysis.  As 
Segal recognized, they faced a “theoretical dilemma”: “the measure of 
when ‘disparate impact’ is sufficient to trigger ERA scrutiny . . . .  This may 
of necessity be an issue left to future interpretation when the ERA is (at 
long last) implemented.”127  However, ERA skeptics would not let propo-
nents defer such questions indefinitely, particularly once witnesses took ad-
vantage of the more ERA-friendly atmosphere of the House hearings to 
highlight the ERA’s potential to attack disparate impact cases.  In the sec-
ond House hearing, held September 14, 1983, Tish Sommers of the Older 
Women’s League emphasized how disparate impact analysis could combat 
sex discriminatory effects of Social Security and ERISA rules, pension 
schemes, and divorce laws on older women.128  NOW President Judy Gold-
smith emphasized the difficulty, if not impossibility, of rooting out sex ine-
quality under a discriminatory intent requirement, and detailed how 
assumptions about women’s economic dependency worked to their detri-
ment in areas like employment, Social Security, pensions, and insurance 
rates.129  League of Women Voters President Dorothy Ridings observed that 
“facially neutral policies” often perpetuated “occupational segregation,” 
discrimination in education and training, and contributed to the “feminiza-
 
124  Memorandum from Phyllis Segal to ERA Legislative History Project, supra note 109, at 9. 
125  Id. at 7.   
126  Id. at 8. 
127  Id. at 9.  “Any thoughts?” she asked her colleagues.  Id. 
128  House Hearings, supra note 79, at 153–54 (statement of Tish Sommers). 
129  Id. at 253–54 (statement of Judy Goldsmith, President, National Organization for Women). 
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tion of poverty.”130  She touted the ERA’s requirement of “rigorous scru-
tiny” of “rules and policies that appear to be gender-neutral but which have 
had disproportionately negative effects on women.”131  In the question and 
answer session that followed, Representative DeWine asked Goldsmith to 
clarify the pro-ERA position: “I think you are telling me, that we are going 
to look at the result of law . . . at how it applies, in fact.  Is that a fair sum-
mary of what is involved?”  Goldsmith replied, “That is correct . . . .”  
DeWine responded, “So we would not have to prove intent; we would not 
look to intent?”  Goldsmith’s answer was unequivocal: “Exactly.”132  
In the absence of a limiting principle to replace discriminatory intent, 
opponents could attack disparate impact theory as a boundless enterprise 
that, taken to its logical conclusion, contained limitless possibilities for un-
dermining the legal and social order.  The topic of disparate impact analysis 
arose most frequently in connection with substantive areas such as military 
regulations, veterans’ employment preferences, family law, abortion fund-
ing, and government benefits programs, especially Social Security.  Each of 
these applications not only called into question entrenched assumptions 
about gender differences, but also appeared potentially to wreak havoc on 
the existing system of laws and regulations.  Opponents often used hyper-
bolic language to forecast the ERA’s effects, but they also raised legitimate 
questions about the outer boundaries of disparate impact theory.  Grappling 
with the objections of critics forced ERA proponents more specifically to 
define the limits of the disparate impact principle.   
In arguing for a disparate impact theory of equal rights unbound to dis-
criminatory intent, feminists first had to assure skeptics that their analysis 
would not subject every statute that had different impacts upon men and 
women to constitutional challenge.133  One oft-cited example was the pro-
gressive income tax.  Since men’s incomes were, as a group, higher than 
women’s, a progressive income tax disproportionately burdened men in a 
way that was easily foreseeable, if not inevitable.134 
Feminists could have attempted to quantify the degree of disparate im-
pact necessary to trigger special judicial scrutiny.  They chose instead a qu-
alitative definition.  Rather than suggesting that all laws that 
disproportionately affected one sex were automatically suspect, proponents 
adopted a formulation that tied the application of heightened scrutiny to a 
particular type of disparate impact: that which, in the words of Ann Freed-
man, was “traceable to and reinforces, or perpetuates, discriminatory pat-
 
130  Id. at 275–76 (statement of Dorothy Ridings, National President, League of Women Voters). 
131  Id. 
132  Id. at 311 (statements of Representative DeWine and Judy Goldsmith). 
133  See, e.g., Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 694 (testimony of Charles Shanor, Professor 
of Law, Emory Law School).  
134  Id.  
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terns similar to those associated with facial discrimination.”135  Because the 
Court had already tackled many instances of facial discrimination under the 
Equal Protection Clause, Freedman could draw extensively from the lan-
guage of the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in characteriz-
ing those “discriminatory patterns.”136  She then explained that the 
progressive income tax would not be vulnerable under this standard “be-
cause the disparate impact of the income tax on men is not the product of 
habit or stereotypical ways of thinking about the sexes.”137  Freedman took 
the analysis one step further, attributing significance to the fact that the pro-
gressive income tax had redistributive consequences that “ameliorate[d]” 
sex inequality.138 
b. Applying the antihierarchy approach to family law.—This an-
tihierarchical or ameliorative approach to disparate impact analysis re-
flected feminists’ frustration with a conception of equal rights that appeared 
ultimately to benefit men.  When NOW President Goldsmith described the 
need for the ERA to incorporate disparate impact analysis, she stressed the 
failure of equal protection jurisprudence to address sex discrimination’s 
particular toll on women.  “Historically, in light of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, sex discrimination that disadvantages men is far more likely to be 
found unconstitutional than sex discrimination harming women,” she told 
the committee.139  However, the Court’s emphasis on the harmful effects of 
sex stereotyping on both men and women created a potential tension be-
tween an antistereotyping impulse and the antihierarchical principle.  No-
where was this tension more apparent than in the realm of family law. 
Visions of babies torn from their mothers’ breasts and homemakers 
forced to leave their children to go to work at low-wage jobs populated the 
imaginations of critics of disparate impact theory’s application to family 
law.  Apocalyptic images of family breakdown, already tediously familiar 
 
135  House Hearings, supra note 79, at 787 (statement of Ann Freedman, Associate Professor of 
Law, Rutgers Law School). 
136  Id. at 787–88 (“Many of the misconceptions and stereotypes that produce sex discriminatory 
neutral rules have been recognized and condemned by the Supreme Court in recent decisions under the 
equal protection clause invalidating facially discriminatory sex classifications.  These include ‘the role 
typing society has long imposed’ on women, particularly the idea that the ‘female is destined solely for 
the home and the rearing of the family’ and not ‘for the marketplace and the world of ideas,’ and ‘as-
sumptions that women are the weaker sex or are more likely to be childrearers or dependents’; the in-
vidious relegation of classes of women ‘to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities’ 
of individual women; the ‘nineteenth century presumption that females are inferior to males’; and the 
willingness to create gender-based hierarchies that keep women ‘in a stereotypic and predefined place’ 
and grant men more responsible and remunerative positions.”  (footnotes omitted)). 
137  Id. at 789. 
138  Id. at 789–90. 
139  Id. at 259 (testimony of NOW presented by Judy Goldsmith, President).  Goldsmith was appar-
ently referring to the 1970s sex discrimination cases brought by male plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Califano v. 
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).  Her comment may 
have also reflected the Court’s failure to recognize discrimination against women in cases like Feeney. 
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from the ERA ratification debates, undoubtedly were overblown.  As even 
Brigham Young University law professor Lynn Wardle, a staunch opponent 
of the amendment, conceded, the ERA “would accelerate the adoption of 
many beneficial reforms in existing family laws in order to equalize the 
general rights and obligations of fathers and mothers and husbands and 
wives.”140  Once the strident rhetoric was stripped away, much of the dis-
agreement between proponents and opponents did concern, as Wardle con-
tended, the desirability of eliminating legal incentives for women to forego 
careers and pursue traditional roles as mothers and wives.141  Although 
Schlafly and others regularly accused feminists of denigrating housewives, 
feminist lawyers had actually devoted considerable time, energy, and re-
sources to addressing the legal plight of homemakers, particularly at di-
vorce.142  Feminists saw homemakers as caught in a no-win situation—a 
legal framework designed to encourage traditional roles, but that provided 
little if any protection to the wife in a traditional marriage gone awry.  
While many antifeminist critiques unfairly impugned feminists’ motives 
and distorted the extent to which existing law truly protected homemakers, 
the application of disparate impact analysis to family law nevertheless 
raised some vexing conceptual problems. 
Child custody decisionmaking provides one example of the dilemmas 
raised by disparate impact theory’s application to family law.  By 1983 and 
1984, it seemed clear that the ERA would invalidate laws and practices that 
automatically granted a preference to mothers in child custody decision-
making.  The maternal preference, which sometimes took the form of the 
“tender years doctrine”—the presumption, given varying degrees of weight, 
that mothers were the best custodians for young children—was already on 
its way out in many jurisdictions, and joint custody was becoming increas-
ingly common.  Some feminists, like Women’s Legal Defense Fund staff 
attorney Nancy Polikoff, argued that judicial biases unfairly disadvantaged 
mothers, not fathers, in custody cases.  Polikoff favored a “primary care-
taker” standard that would reward the investment of mothers in childrear-
ing.143  This primary caretaker standard raised a disparate impact question: it 
 
140  Senate Hearings, Part II, supra note 79, at 3 (statement of Lynn Wardle, Professor of Law, J. 
Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University). 
141  Id. (“Many people believe that there are other differences between men and women than just 
physical differences, that there are emotional differences and psychological differences, differences in 
the way that they nurture and relate to children, and that those differences ought to be taken into account 
or at least States ought to be allowed to take those differences into account in establishing family law.”). 
142  For a critical account of feminists’ focus on homemakers, see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, 
THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY 53–75 (1991). 
143  See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in 
Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 235 (1982); see also Garska v. McCoy, 
278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) (rare case adopting primary caretaker standard); Martha L. Fineman, Im-
plementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the 
Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789 (questioning the benefits to women 
of a formal equality approach to family law decisionmaking). 
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seemed likely if not certain that facially sex-neutral decision rules that em-
phasized the best interests of the child or favored the “primary caretaker” 
would result in more mothers than fathers receiving custody because, as an 
empirical matter, they were far more involved in caring for children during 
marriage.144 
The implications of the antistereotyping and antihierarchical principles 
in the custody context were not entirely clear.  On the one hand, a father’s 
claim that custody decisions, even if ostensibly sex-neutral, exerted a sex-
based disproportionate impact on men seemed consistent with feminists’ 
contention that even facially sex-neutral laws stemmed from and reinforced 
the sex stereotypes that relegated women to the home and accorded men ex-
clusive access to the “marketplace and the world of ideas.”145  If women’s 
inferior economic position derived at least in part from their disproportion-
ate responsibility for child-rearing, which in turn aggravated the adverse fi-
nancial impact of divorce, then a system that effectively favored women’s 
claims to custody might not only be unfair to men, but might in fact be con-
trary to women’s interests—particularly if accompanied by weak enforce-
ment of the noncustodial parent’s child support obligations.  On the other 
hand, altering the best interests of the child standard in a manner that would 
devalue women’s investment in childrearing after the fact seemed clearly 
detrimental to individual women and, potentially, to children.   
Perhaps in part to deflect concerns about the applicability of disparate 
impact analysis to areas like child custody, feminists tended to emphasize 
property management and distribution rules as the primary targets of dispa-
rate impact analysis in the family law context.  In this area, the tension be-
tween combating assumptions about the proper roles of men and women 
while acknowledging the social reality of disparate participation in child-
rearing and homemaking activities seemed less acute.  Feminists stood on 
somewhat firmer theoretical ground when they asserted that the ERA would 
undermine property distribution rules that undervalued homemakers’ con-
tributions to the household.  Challenging the distribution of financial re-
sources between husbands and wives fit more comfortably with the 
antihierarchy principle because women were clearly the disadvantaged par-
ties in jurisdictions that maintained title-based property distribution rules or 
otherwise failed to account for nonmonetary contributions in dividing prop-
erty at dissolution.  Applying disparate impact analysis to these distributive 
rules also allowed feminists to highlight how the ERA would bolster the 
position of homemakers.  A similar analysis applied to alimony awards.  
When Senator Hatch asked NOW LDEF attorney Marsha Levick whether a 
 
144  For a contemporaneous empirical analysis of child custody awards, see, for example, Lenore J. 
Weitzman & Ruth B. Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child 
Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471 (1979).  
145  Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975) (“No longer is the female destined solely for the 
home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.”). 
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jurisdiction that gave a disproportionate number of alimony awards to 
women would be subject to a disparate impact challenge, she could reply 
that no, “an increased number of support awards to women in the event that 
those awards were appropriately extended could not be considered to be 
discrimination against men.  In fact, what they would be doing would be at-
tempting to ameliorate the effects of discrimination against women.”146  
When anti-ERA activists accused feminists of devaluing homemaking, fe-
minists protested that, in fact, the amendment would give homemakers ad-
ditional protection both during marriage and at divorce.  But, as the child 
custody example revealed, the tension between compensating women for 
their contributions to the household and upending legal rules that reinforced 
traditional gender roles was not easily overcome by a simple application of 
the antihierarchy principle. 
c. Veterans’ preferences, social services, and the ghost of equal 
protection.—The antihierarchy principle did, at least in theory, limit dispa-
rate impact analysis to laws and policies that disadvantaged women.  In the 
case of veterans’ employment preferences, perhaps the most prominent 
arena in which feminists promoted the disparate impact theory, the burden 
on women could hardly have been more pronounced.  To ERA opponents, 
however, the veterans’ preference example proved too much because any 
government program that provided special benefits to veterans inevitably 
would benefit men almost exclusively.  Opponents seized on this issue in 
the hearings: some suggested that disparate impact analysis would invali-
date not only absolute veterans’ preference programs like the one at issue in 
Feeney, but all preferences for veterans in employment, and would even 
call into question the validity of veterans’ benefits programs more gener-
ally.147  
Such predictions were, of course, calculated to cause maximal political 
consternation, but they also raised salient questions about the scope of dis-
parate impact theory.  The veterans’ preference issue was a mixed blessing 
for ERA proponents.  Since the only Supreme Court case to address a con-
stitutional sex-based disparate impact claim concerned veterans’ prefer-
ences and it was one of several specific targets of ERA II, proponents 
tended to use the Massachusetts program upheld in Feeney as an example of 
how disparate impact analysis would apply.  Because the lower courts in 
 
146  Senate Hearings, Part II, supra note 79, at 76 (statement of Marsha Levick, Legal Director, 
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund).  In addition to emphasizing areas in which the “amelioration 
of discrimination” argument was more straightforward, ERA proponents also referred to cases decided 
under state ERAs to answer opponents’ charges that the disparate impact standard would wreak havoc 
on family law in general, and child custody decisionmaking in particular.  For instance, when Wardle 
cited child custody as an example of how disparate impact theory might apply to allow men to challenge 
custody regimes that resulted in fewer fathers receiving custody, Levick pointed to two Colorado cases 
in which courts rejected such arguments under the state’s ERA.  Id. at 77.   
147  See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 79, at 299–300; Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 
681–86; see also Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
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Feeney had engaged in the kind of factfinding that proponents envisioned 
occurring under the ERA, it provided a handy concrete application of what 
could often seem like an abstract theory.148  Further, the “absolute” nature of 
the Massachusetts preference enabled proponents to distinguish the pro-
gram from other veterans’ preference schemes less burdensome to women.  
But the specificity of the Massachusetts example did not succeed in deflect-
ing difficult questions about the reach of the disparate impact theory to oth-
er benefits for veterans and to the provision of government benefits and 
services more generally.   
ERA proponents approached disparate impact analysis of government 
benefit provisions cautiously.  For one thing, the issue was entangled with 
the complicated and politically fraught questions surrounding the exclusion 
of pregnancy from disability benefit coverage and the denial of Medicaid 
funding for abortion.149  For another, feminists were wary of defining ac-
tionable disparate impact too narrowly.  Still, charges from veterans’ groups 
that disparate impact analysis ultimately would threaten all kinds of gov-
ernment support for veterans150 led ERA proponents to distinguish employ-
ment preferences from other policies benefiting veterans.  NOW LDEF 
attorney Phyllis Segal began her Senate testimony on veterans’ programs by 
drawing a distinction between benefits “funded from the public treasury 
[that] do not impose any direct costs on individuals,” on the one hand, and 
civil service employment preferences, whose “burden[s] fall[] directly on 
those individuals who are denied jobs or promotions because they do not 
have veteran status.”151  
The flip side of the question—the denial of social services, such as 
welfare benefits, that disproportionately impacted women—also proved 
tricky.  As University of North Carolina law professor Judith Welch Wegn-
er put it in her Senate testimony, how to view the disparate impact caused 
by “[d]ecisions to deny certain types or levels of social services” was “per-
haps the most troublesome” question facing theorists of disparate impact 
discrimination.152  In the end, Wegner fell back on the Supreme Court’s ju-
risprudence in race cases in an effort to assuage concerns that the ERA 
would subject legislative funding decisions to endless constitutional scru-
 
148  See Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976), question certified by Massa-
chusetts v. Feeney, 429 U.S. 66 (1976), vacated, Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 U.S. 884 (1977), re-
manded to Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978), rev’d, Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
149  For more on the abortion controversy, see infra Part II.D.  
150  See, e.g., Letter from A. Leo Anderson, Washington, DC Liaison Officer, National Association 
of State Directors of Veterans Affairs to Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Oct. 17, 1983), reprinted in 
Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 762. 
151  Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 765–66 (statement on the impact of the Equal Rights 
Amendment on veterans programs by Phyllis N. Segal). 
152  Id. at 890 (statement of Judith Welch Wegner, Professor, University of North Carolina School of 
Law). 
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tiny.  She cited decisions like NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., in which the 
Third Circuit upheld a medical center’s decision to relocate to the suburbs 
notwithstanding its adverse impact on inner-city minority communities, 
surmising that courts would “demonstrate sensitivity to legislative resource-
allocation decisions” under the ERA as well.153  
d. Disparate impact and military employment: Title VII as a li-
miting principle.—If equal protection jurisprudence helped to limit the 
reach of disparate impact analysis in the realm of social services cuts, when 
it came to military employment, feminists imported principles from Title 
VII cases to assure skeptics that the ERA would not upend military prepar-
edness.  In the military context, where the invalidity of explicit sex-based 
classifications was a hard enough pill to swallow, a disparate impact analy-
sis suggested to some ERA skeptics that the amendment would effectively 
require women to make up fifty percent of draftees and even combat sol-
diers.  Delaware Law School professor William A. Stanmeyer declared that 
disparate impact analysis would “require that one-half the eligible married 
women be drafted, while their husbands stay home, and in many cases take 
care of the baby.”154  Less dramatically and perhaps more credibly, other 
witnesses predicted that the ERA would precipitate a lowering of physical 
standards when such standards were found disproportionately to exclude 
women from certain positions.  The effects of such a lowering of standards 
on military readiness could be devastating, a number of witnesses sug-
gested.155   
These arguments placed ERA proponents in something of a bind.  
Military service was not, in fact, one of the areas in which disparate impact 
analysis was most necessary—in the military, explicit sex-based classifica-
tions remained prevalent, and their removal would be revolutionary enough.  
Proponents stressed that their goal was not to lower standards; in fact, they 
emphasized, judging individuals based upon their actual abilities rather than 
their sex would actually enhance merit-based decisionmaking.  As one in-
ternal memo stated the proponents’ position, “What ERA would establish is 
a policy by which men and women are assigned to positions based upon 
their individual abilities rather than upon a sex-based classification.”156  
Military servicewomen testified in the congressional hearings that eradicat-
 
153  Id. at 891 (citing NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); Jennings v. Al-
exander, 715 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1983)).  Note that these were Title VI and Rehabilitation Act cases, 
respectively. 
154  House Hearings, supra note 79, at 653 (testimony of Professor William A. Stanmeyer on the 
impact of the ERA on the military). 
155  See, e.g., id. at 649–64 (testimony of William A. Stanmeyer on the impact of the ERA on the 
military); id. at 668–70 (statement of Brigadier General Elizabeth P. Hoisington (USA, Ret.)); id. at 
671–81 (statement of Mary Lawlor). 
156  Memorandum from Ethan Naftalin to Sana Shtasel (June 8, 1983) (on file with Schlesinger Li-
brary, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, Box 23, Folder 31). 
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ing explicit sex-based discrimination would enable the armed forces to ful-
fill their personnel needs more efficiently and effectively, because they 
could draw from a larger pool of potential service members.  ERA propo-
nents wished to make clear that they were not seeking lower standards, but 
simply bare-bones equal opportunity.  They needed, therefore, to place 
some limit on the reach of disparate impact analysis in the military context.  
As Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL) attorney Jeanne Atkins put it 
in a preparatory memo to pro-ERA witness and former Undersecretary of 
the Air Force Antonia Chayes, “[A]s the hearings move along it becomes 
clearer that the constitutional law must be made clear.”157 
The antihierarchical or “amelioration of discrimination” approach was 
less useful as a limiting principle when it came to the military.  Although 
women’s exclusion from the draft and combat could have been interpreted 
as benign, ERA advocates had long ago decided to frame those exclusions 
as discriminatory.158  Once explicit sex-based distinctions were removed, 
presumably facially sex-neutral physical requirements could effectively ex-
clude many if not most women from certain positions.  This seemed a clas-
sic instance of disparate impact discrimination that perpetuated old sex 
classifications in the guise of gender neutrality.  Because they could not rely 
on the antihierarchy principle to cabin the reach of disparate impact analysis 
in the military context, feminists agreed that heightened scrutiny would ap-
ply to physical requirements that disproportionately excluded willing wom-
en from positions in the service, but argued that the means-ends test itself 
left room for truly necessary physical standards and requirements.   
Strict scrutiny, on this account, would not be fatal in fact but rather 
would bear a striking resemblance to Title VII’s job-relatedness require-
ment.  Jeanne Paquette Atkins, staff attorney at WEAL and project associ-
ate at the National Information Center on Women and the Military, told the 
House subcommittee in October 1983, 
[T]o the extent that such gender-neutral criteria might disproportionately ex-
clude women from participation, those criteria would be subject to rigorous 
examination.  Congress would be obligated to assure that such standards were 
indeed job-related, that is, that the qualities measured were necessary to the ef-
ficient performance of the military role in question.159 
Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) attempted to translate Atkins’s 
testimony into a recognizable legal standard: “[What] you are saying is that 
the Equal Rights Amendment does not eliminate job-related qualifications 
 
157  Letter from Jeanne Atkins to Antonia Chayes (Sept. 21, 1983) (on file with Sterling Memorial 
Library, Yale University, Thomas Emerson Papers, Box 23, Folder 344). 
158  See Jane Mansbridge, Who’s in Charge Here? Decision by Accretion and Gatekeeping in the 
Struggle for the ERA, 13 POL. & SOC’Y 343 (1984). 
159  House Hearings, supra note 79, at 566 (statement of Jeanne Paquette Atkins, Staff Attorney, 
Women’s Equity Action League, and Project Associate, the National Information Center on Women and 
the Military). 
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. . . like under standards set forth in the [Griggs v.] Duke Power case and 
other cases that have established the law in this area.”160  At a Senate hear-
ing several days later, Chayes indicated in her testimony that ERA propo-
nents were willing to accept that many physical requirements in the military 
were in fact job-related.  Questioned pointedly by Senator Hatch about the 
cryptic reference to disparate impact in the 1971 Yale ERA Article, which 
seemed to him to suggest the invalidation of most military physical stan-
dards, Chayes replied, “There has been a long history of disparate impact 
[analysis] since Professor Emerson wrote.  I think we have got to accept the 
consequences of the job relatedness of the requirements.  I am prepared to 
accept it as I think most ERA proponents are.”161  This was a significant 
concession, given that presumably it would not be difficult to assert the job-
relatedness of virtually all physical requirements in the military.162  
e. The remedial dilemma.—The controversial nature of dispa-
rate impact analysis did not only concern how disparate impact would be 
defined or what standard of review would apply.  ERA skeptics also pushed 
proponents to articulate how laws and policies exerting a disparate impact 
would have to be revised to remedy their discriminatory effects.  For in-
stance, in the veterans’ preference context, proponents could refer to the 
Feeney dissent, which left room for less discriminatory alternatives, includ-
ing less extreme or “absolute” employment preferences for veterans.  
Moreover, because states other than Massachusetts had veterans’ preference 
programs that ERA proponents claimed would withstand constitutional 
scrutiny, concrete examples of solutions to the disparate impact problem 
were available.  However, in other areas of the law, less discriminatory al-
ternatives were more elusive, difficult to define, or politically fraught. 
The debate over disparate impact’s application to Social Security illus-
trates this problem.  ERA proponents’ critique of the Social Security system 
highlighted the ways in which assumptions that men would be family 
breadwinners and women dependent homemakers—or at most secondary 
wage-earners—disadvantaged women by perpetuating their dependence 
upon men, and in some cases, threatening them with destitution in the event 
of divorce or a husband’s premature death.  ERA opponents disputed every 
aspect of feminists’ analysis, arguing that, if anything, Social Security rules 
benefited women more than men.163  Perhaps the most difficult questions 
were those about how Congress could bring the Social Security system into 
 
160  Id. at 593 (statement of Representative Patricia Schroeder). 
161  Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 360–61 (statement of Antonia Handler Chayes).  
162  Proponents did not introduce into the debate the concept of “business necessity,” an important 
component of Title VII disparate impact doctrine. 
163  See, e.g., Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 811–75.  Though the details are complicated, 
the dispute essentially boiled down to how the witnesses were defining advantage and disadvantage, and 
which women were the objects of concern.  The Social Security system arguably disadvantaged two-
earner households as compared to single-earner households, thereby incentivizing homemaking. 
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compliance with the ERA.  Moreover, when pressed for specifics, propo-
nents faced a choice between proposing very controversial solutions—such 
as a homemaker’s tax or “earnings sharing”164—or declining to specify what 
solution Congress should adopt.  For the most part, proponents chose the 
latter option, insisting that Congress would have discretion to choose whi-
chever less discriminatory alternative legislators thought best.165 
ERA skeptics were concerned that remedying disparate impact dis-
crimination might require overhauling or bankrupting the Social Security 
system, but they were even more disturbed by the association between dis-
parate impact and affirmative action, and by extension, “quotas” and other 
controversial racial policies like “forced busing” and voting rights remedies.  
These associations made even congressional supporters of the new ERA 
wary of disparate impact’s political implications.  The ERA Legislative 
History Project’s coordinator Sally Burns wrote to her colleagues in early 
October 1983, “Pro senators still resist the effects test and keep trying to 
persuade us that a foreseeable consequences test achieves the same re-
sult.”166  The senators’ lack of responsiveness to feminists’ argument that 
the “foreseeability” standard did not go far enough led Burns to believe that 
“they are more concerned with the political objections to the effects test.”167  
She noted, “The senators with whom we have so [far] met predict that ef-
fects [analysis] will conjure forced busing and no at large voting dis-
tricts.”168  As Burns saw it, feminists were caught in something of a Catch-
22: “[A]s a reason to reject the effects test we are faced with racism on the 
one hand and with the equation that our no intent standard means that we 
seek a standard higher than race on the other.”169  As the next section de-
scribes, the amendment’s friends and foes battled over the ERA’s relation-
ship to affirmative action on the familiar but fraught terrain of race. 
 
164  Both of these proposals were attempts to resolve what feminists perceived as the Social Security 
system’s bias against two-earner households.  Earnings sharing “would allocate half of a couple’s com-
bined earnings during marriage to each spouse for purposes of calculating Social Security benefits.”  
Goodwin Liu, Social Security and the Treatment of Marriage: Spousal Benefits, Earnings Sharing, and 
the Challenge of Reform, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1, 3.  A homemaker’s tax could presumably have taken a 
variety of forms, but its purpose was apparently to place a monetary value on homemaking work so that 
married women working outside the home would not be subject to greater income tax burdens than ho-
memakers. 
165  See, e.g., Memorandum from Marsha Levick to NOW-NOW LDEF ERA Legislative History 
Committee, supra note 107, at 4 (“Would ERA require a homemaker’s tax for Social Security?  Without 
stating specifically what ERA might require, it does seem clear that the disparate effect which our pre-
sent social security system has on the economic status and rights of women would require some con-
gressional reform of that system.”). 
166  Memorandum from Sarah E. Burns, ERA Legislative History Project, to ERA Attorneys 1 (Oct. 
4 1983) (on file with Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, Thomas Emerson Papers, Box 23, 
Folder 344).  
167  Id. 
168  Id. 
169  Id. 
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3. “Trying to Have Your Cake and Eat It Too”: Affirmative Ac-
tion.—Just as proponents quickly realized that they would need to tackle the 
subject of disparate impact discrimination in congressional hearings on 
ERA II, they understood early on that the amendment’s relationship to af-
firmative action required clarification.  When women’s rights advocates 
consulted Tom Emerson about their strategy for the new ERA hearings, he 
emphasized the heightened importance of this issue, which had received lit-
tle attention during the hearings in 1971 and 1972.170  The potential effect of 
the ERA on affirmative action remained somewhat obscure during the rati-
fication period.171  Proponents often avoided questions about affirmative ac-
tion, and when they did answer them, they frequently vacillated between 
declaring that the ERA banned all sex classifications regardless of intent, 
and alluding vaguely to Title VII as a model for analyzing affirmative ac-
tion under the amendment.  At the same time, in litigation under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, feminists were attempting 
to distinguish between the sorts of “benign” or “protective” classifications 
that they believed were the product of sex stereotypes and assumptions 
about women’s and men’s proper roles, and “genuine affirmative action” 
designed to achieve equality between men and women.172  This dilemma 
persisted in debates over ERA II, as members of Congress sought clarifica-
tion of proponents’ position on the definition of “equality of rights” under 
the amendment. 
But whereas in the first congressional ERA campaign opponents fo-
cused on the amendment’s potential to eviscerate “protective” or “benign” 
laws, in this second round that objection was far less frequent than its in-
verse: that the ERA would effectively require affirmative action, or “quo-
tas.”  In the first ERA debate, opponents emphasized the amendment’s 
alleged rigidity—its absolute commitment to equality that made no allow-
ances for benignly intended protections; now they complained that the ERA 
would mandate not merely equality of opportunity, but equality of results.  
At the same time that opponents expressed doubt about the clarity of pro-
ponents’ distinction between “benign classifications,” which the ERA 
would prohibit, and permissible “affirmative action,” opponents tacitly ac-
knowledged the difference between them by tolerating the first—even 
mourning their demise—while opposing the second.   
ERA proponents identified affirmative action as one of several areas 
“for further research” in March 1983 as they prepared for new congres-
sional hearings.  In a memorandum to her colleagues, Phyllis Segal made 
 
170  Memorandum from Sally Burns, ERA Legislative History Project, to the Attorneys for the ERA 
and Working Groups for the ERA (July 19, 1983) (on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, 
Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, Box 23, Folder 31). 
171  See MAYERI, supra note 120. 
172  See id.; Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 
1797–99 (2008). 
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clear that the validity of at least some form of affirmative action under the 
ERA was beyond question.  “Obviously,” she wrote, “applying the ‘abso-
lute prohibition’ concept of scrutiny in such situations would elevate 
‘equality in theory’ over ‘equality in fact.’  Where differential treatment is 
targeted to achieve equality it should survive scrutiny under the ERA.”173  
She explained that the ERA’s original legislative history, federal equal pro-
tection jurisprudence, and state ERA caselaw were all consistent with this 
view, but that several points needed to be “clarified and stressed” in the 
second round of hearings.  First, Segal wrote, proponents needed to clarify 
that the definition of affirmative action included efforts “designed to bring 
about equality (not as compensation, but as agent for change).”174  This, she 
emphasized, entailed not just the goal of “more participation” by women, 
“but also efforts to modify policies that appear neutral but are not.  This is 
the flip side of the disparate impact memo discussion—another way to ac-
complish a broader view of equality.”175  Affirmative action was an impor-
tant legal tool for remedying not only facial discrimination, but also more 
subtle forms of bias and structural inequality. 
While ERA proponents still faced the old challenge of distinguishing 
between allegedly compensatory classifications that in fact reinforced ste-
reotypical views of women as dependents and truly remedial policies, 
changes in the legal and political climate since 1972 also required them to 
respond to charges that affirmative action for women unfairly discriminated 
against men and undermined meritocratic ideals.176  Segal hoped that “rein-
forcing and clarifying the treatment of affirmative action under the ERA 
might avoid the protracted reverse discrimination challenges that [were] be-
ing litigated in race cases under the [Equal Protection Clause].”177  She re-
quested “[a]dditional analysis . . . to develop the points which would be 
helpful in this regard.”178 
As they had begun to do during the ratification struggle, ERA oppo-
nents seized every opportunity to suggest that the amendment would lead 
down a slippery slope to not merely encouraging, but requiring equal out-
comes for men and women, even in contexts where most Americans be-
lieved sex differences were, if not immutable, enduring and perhaps even 
desirable.  Opponents immediately grasped the connection between dispa-
rate impact analysis and affirmative action, grouping both under the rubric 
 
173  Memorandum from Phyllis Segal to ERA Legislative History Project, supra note 109, at 1. 
174  Id. at 2–3 (emphasis added). 
175  Id. at 3 n.*.   
176  While those arguments were beginning to surface in other contexts in the early 1970s, they had 
not played a significant role in early ERA debates.  On growing opposition to affirmative action in the 
early 1970s, see NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN 
WORKPLACE (2006). 
177  Memorandum from Phyllis Segal to ERA Legislative History Project, supra note 109, at 3. 
178  Id. 
103:1223  (2009) A New E.R.A. or a New Era? 
 1265
of “equal results.”179  They frequently raised the specter of “quotas” as the 
likely if not inevitable result of the ERA, especially in light of develop-
ments in the race context.  Professor Wardle warned that the concept of qu-
otas would creep even into family law: 
Thirty years ago, when the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, no one would have believed you if you had said that in order to achieve 
racial equality you would set up racial quotas.  Thirty years from now we may 
look back and be saying the same sort of things about sexual equality in family 
relations, custody, alimony.180 
The case of United Steelworkers v. Weber181 was the opponents’ favorite 
example of unintended consequences in this regard.  The congressional 
sponsors of Title VII had not envisioned that the statute would permit af-
firmative action by employers, yet the Court had validated just such prac-
tices in Weber.182  As Professor Rees put it in one of the later Senate 
hearings on ERA II, “in the famous example of the Weber case and other 
cases, the [C]ourt has simply explained away one part of the legislative his-
tory . . . .”183  For the most part, ERA skeptics did not even bother to explain 
why such developments were undesirable; merely raising the specter of qu-
otas and referring to experience with affirmative action under the Equal 
Protection Clause and Title VII was, for them, a case of res ipsa loquitur.   
While to opponents the race cases served as a cautionary tale of courts 
run amok, ERA proponents embraced them—but not because the race pre-
 
179  In the first hearing on ERA II, Senator Hatch seized on the suggestion in the 1971 Yale ERA Ar-
ticle that admissions qualifications for the military would have to be structured so that they did not ex-
clude more women than men, remarking, “It seems to me that [this] concept of equal opportunity is 
straight affirmative action analysis.”  Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 67 (testimony of Senator 
Orrin G. Hatch).  In explicating the “six different Equal Rights Amendments” he asserted could result 
from the amendment, Grover Rees III “lump[ed] together . . . for convenience of discussion” the “equal 
protection principles that have been labeled the ‘equal outcomes model,’ the ‘equal respect model,’ and 
the ‘affirmative action model,’” arguing that “[t]he shift in focus from a prohibition of purposeful dis-
crimination to differential impact” implicated all of these consequences.  House Hearings, supra note 
79, at 27, 29 (statement of Grover Rees III, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of 
Law).  Rees argued that proponents’ promotion of an “effects test,” would make the ERA “an affirma-
tive action amendment, not just an individual rights amendment.”  Id. at 25.  Anti-ERA witness Edward 
Erler, called by Hatch to testify at a hearing devoted to “defining discrimination” agreed.  “[T]he argu-
ment about ERA is no longer an argument about equal rights, but an argument about equal results.  Un-
der ERA, proportionality will necessarily be the test of gender discrimination.”  Senate Hearings, Part I, 
supra note 83, at 877, 895 (statement of Edward J. Erler, Professor, National Endowment for the Hu-
manities). 
180  Senate Hearings, Part II, supra note 79, at 78 (testimony of Lynn D. Wardle, Professor of Law, 
J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University). 
181  443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
182  For a discussion of congressional intent with respect to affirmative action and Title VII, see Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 321, 328–32 (1990). 
183  Senate Hearings, Part II, supra note 79, at 187 (testimony of Grover Rees III, Assistant Profes-
sor of Law, University of Texas School of Law). 
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cedents provided a particularly expansive template for affirmative action for 
women.  Indeed, to proponents, cases like Bakke184 stood for the limits on, 
rather than the possibilities of, affirmative action.  Strict scrutiny was a 
more stringent standard than that which applied to sex-based classifications, 
including those arguably designed to promote sex equality.  Liberal Justices 
and advocates frequently argued for applying a lower standard of scrutiny 
to racial classifications designed to promote equality.185  For feminists, strict 
scrutiny was a mixed blessing: on the positive side, it might prevent courts 
from taking at face value claims that “benign” sex classifications were mo-
tivated by a desire to ameliorate discrimination; on the negative side, it 
could curtail efforts at “genuine” affirmative action.  Thus when ERA pro-
ponents cited race cases as precedent for the ERA’s treatment of affirmative 
action, they were in fact making something of a concession to opponents at 
the same time that they were leaving the door open to proactive efforts at 
achieving equality through sex classifications. 
Amendment advocates turned to the race precedents almost automati-
cally when Senator Hatch raised the affirmative action issue in the first 
hearing on ERA II.  In a memorandum to women’s organizations written 
immediately after the first Senate hearing in May, Marsha Levick recorded 
the feminist litigators’ responses to Hatch’s questions about the status of a 
hypothetical ten percent set-aside for women in government contracting.  
She wrote: 
Presumably, such affirmative sex-conscious “remedies” would be no more or 
less unconstitutional than the comparable race-conscious programs addressed 
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke186 and Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick:187 if an “institutionally competent actor” makes a finding of past dis-
crimination vis-à-vis that institution, industry, etc., sex-conscious programs 
could be implemented.188 
The “etc.” in Levick’s sentence masked a key question: whether general, 
society-wide discrimination was an adequate justification for sex-based af-
firmative action.  The Court had suggested that it was in Califano v. Web-
ster,189 but that same question was the subject of sometimes bitter struggle 
 
184  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
185  Indeed, as I explore elsewhere, some feminists argued in the late 1970s that sex equality prece-
dents allowing legislatures to take societal discrimination into account when designing compensatory 
policies for women provided a good template for race-based affirmative action jurisprudence.  See May-
eri, supra note 172. 
186  438 U.S. 265. 
187  448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
188  Memorandum from Marsha Levick to NOW-NOW LDEF ERA Legislative History Committee, 
supra note 107, at 7 (footnotes added). 
189  430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam) (noting that the purpose of the statute in question was 
“redressing our society’s longstanding disparate treatment of women” (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 
430 U.S. 199, 209 n.8 (1977)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).   
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in the context of race.190  When making the case to pro-ERA legislators, 
ERA proponents framed congressional power to enact remedial legislation 
in more expansive terms: 
Where a qualified legislative or executive institution has found as a factual 
predicate that a racial minority has suffered from past societal discrimination, 
it may pass remedial legislation . . . .  By equating a sexual classification with 
a racial classification, the ERA would permit such legislation in favor of wom-
en.191 
As the hearings progressed, it became clear that the analogy to race-
based affirmative action was attractive in large part because it undermined 
opponents’ charges that the ERA would mandate “equality of results” in all 
circumstances.  For instance, when opponents warned of the potential for 
fifty percent quotas for women in the military, proponents could point to the 
desegregation of the armed forces as belying this concern.192  Similarly, in 
the Senate hearings on the ERA’s impact on the military, Hatch asked pro-
ERA witness Chayes whether the ERA would permit or require affirmative 
action for women.  She carefully replied that “where you are dealing with 
affirmative action issues, where the policies are designed to correct inequi-
ties of the past, just as in race cases, they will be very carefully scrutinized 
by the courts, if, indeed, they ever get to the courts.”193   
In this sense, the race-based affirmative action precedents served as an 
additional limiting principle to confine the reach of disparate impact analy-
sis.  As we saw earlier, proponents stressed that the application of disparate 
 
190  See Mayeri, supra note 172 (describing feminists’ attempts during the 1970s to convince the 
Court to apply the more lenient standard developed in sex equality cases to race-based affirmative ac-
tion). 
191  ERA Q’s and A’s (Kennedy) (on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard Uni-
versity, Catherine East Papers, Box 23, Folder 30).   
192  For example, when Delaware law professor Stanmeyer proclaimed that the ERA would require 
fifty percent quotas for women in the military, including in combat roles, Columbia law professor Henry 
Monaghan could allude to the desegregation of the armed forces to respond, “That’s plainly insupport-
able. . . .  I mean, the race analogy is perfect . . . .  There just is no basis for reading the Equal Rights 
Amendment as imposing quotas on the military.”  House Hearings, supra note 79, at 685 (statement of 
Henry Paul Monaghan, Professor of Law, Columbia University). 
193  Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 341–42 (testimony of Antonia Handler Chayes).  
Hatch had asked Chayes about the ramifications of the ERA for a 1975 Court decision upholding a pro-
motion scheme that allowed servicewomen additional time to achieve promotion before the military’s 
up-or-out policy would apply.  See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S 498 (1975).  After further back-and-
forth, she added, “I do not see any problem with affirmative action.  We have dealt, I think, very nicely 
with these problems in the title VII experience, and also under the equal protection clause.”  Senate 
Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 342.  When Hatch pressed her further on whether the ERA would 
mandate affirmative action for women in the service academies, Chayes again relied on the race cases, 
saying, “I do not particularly see vastly greater numbers of women being admitted to service schools, as 
compensation for past discrimination, particularly after the Bakke case . . . .”  Id. at 352.  Though she did 
not elaborate, Chayes presumably was referring to Bakke’s failure to endorse  a compensatory rationale 
for affirmative action in the university context.  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
306 n.34, 307–10 (1978). 
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impact analysis to the Social Security system would not mandate any par-
ticular remedy, but rather would leave remediation to the discretion of Con-
gress.  Similarly, they emphasized that, in the words of Levick’s 
memorandum, “[t]he Equal Rights Amendment must be seen for what it is: 
A prohibition against how laws are made, or how they are implemented, 
and not a guarantee of affirmative protection requiring particular action by 
Congress or State legislatures.”194   
Proponents also used an affirmative action rationale to limit the “abso-
lute” nature of the prohibition on sex classifications in the context of single-
sex education.  They argued that while public single-sex schools and col-
leges would generally be unconstitutional under the ERA, there would be 
an exception for all-female institutions designed to overcome the effects of 
past discrimination and foster greater equality between women and men.  
This position was the product of a compromise among feminists.  Some 
would have preferred to insert into the ERA’s legislative history an excep-
tion for single-sex colleges generally; others would have eschewed all ex-
ceptions to the coeducational rule.195  Conveniently, this compromise was 
also the standard articulated in the 1982 Supreme Court decision in Missis-
sippi University for Women v. Hogan,196 the first high-profile opinion au-
thored by the first female Justice, Reagan-appointee Sandra Day O’Connor.  
Hogan, as proponents often reminded their audience, had enshrined just the 
distinction they wished to make: “Just as under present law, under the ERA 
some schools or programs for women could continue affirmative admis-
sions policies and compensatory aid for women if their single-sex nature is 
evaluated as making a positive contribution to overcoming the effects of 
discrimination and promoting sex equality.”197  Again, proponents relied on 
equal protection jurisprudence to limit the ERA’s reach on one dimension, 
even as they reached beyond the Fourteenth Amendment in defining the 
ERA’s meaning on other dimensions. 
As the head of a formerly all-female public women’s school, Hunter 
College President Donna Shalala seemed the perfect witness to explain the 
pro-ERA position on single-sex institutions.  “The effect of the Equal 
 
194  Memorandum from Marsha Levick to NOW-NOW LDEF ERA Legislative History Committee, 
supra note 107, at 1.  Opponents warned that these assurances were empty: Harvard government profes-
sor Eliot Cohen, for instance, predicted that even in the absence of a legal mandate for affirmative ac-
tion, political pressure would force such policies on the government, including the military.  Senate 
Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 305 (statement of Eliot A. Cohen, Professor, Department of Govern-
ment, Harvard University). 
195  See, e.g., Memorandum from Marsha Levick to NOW-NOW LDEF ERA Legislative History 
Committee, supra note 107, at 5 (noting in handwritten text: “Put into legis history ERA not intended to 
affect single sex private schools.”). 
196  458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
197  Memorandum from Sally Burns, ERA Legislative History Project, to the Attorneys for the ERA 
and Working Groups for the ERA, Re: Answers to Hatch Questions and Meeting with Hill Staff (July 
19, 1983) (on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Pa-
pers, Box 23, Folder 29) (citing Hogan as precedent).   
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Rights Amendment on education is simple,” she wrote in her prepared tes-
timony.  “The choice of whether to discriminate on account of sex in educa-
tion will no longer be an option.  This means that unless educational 
policies are justified by principles of affirmative action, schools must treat 
males and females the same.”198  “Simplicity” notwithstanding, Shalala 
found herself unexpectedly under attack from both sides.  Senator Howard 
Metzenbaum (D-OH), the only pro-ERA senator on hand that day, hap-
pened to enter the room while Shalala was explaining the affirmative action 
exception to the ban on public single-sex colleges.  As ERA Legislative 
History Project coordinator Sally Burns described, “[w]ithout pausing, 
Metzenbaum took issue with Shalala, stating that he would not favor an 
ERA that permitted such a thing.  He left without asking the helpful ques-
tions that he had come to pose.”199  Metzenbaum supported affirmative ac-
tion generally, but objected to the exception as applied to women’s 
colleges, and “he [was] not alone.”200  Meanwhile, Shalala was also under 
fire from Hatch and from Jeremy Rabkin, a government professor from 
Cornell.  Rabkin challenged Shalala on the affirmative action exception as 
well, noting the absence of such a qualification in the race context: 
Neither the Department of Education, the Justice Department, nor any court, so 
far as I am aware, has ever said, “If you want to be an all-black institution for 
affirmative action reasons, that is all right, and you can exclude white appli-
cants.” . . .  Since racial segregation is not allowed even for affirmative action 
reasons, I cannot understand what justification there could be for saying, 
“Well, we will allow it in the case of sex discrimination, because some women 
think it is good for them.”  That seems to me to be trying to have your cake 
and eat it too.201 
In redefining the meaning of “equal rights under the law,” ERA propo-
nents were engaged, simultaneously, in a number of delicate balancing acts.  
For ERA II to be a worthwhile endeavor, the amendment had to move fe-
minists beyond existing equal protection jurisprudence.  By 1983, height-
ened scrutiny had vanquished many, though not all, explicit sex-based legal 
distinctions, and the Court had established a very restrictive approach to 
constitutional disparate impact cases.  Without a robust interpretation of the 
ERA’s applicability to sex-neutral laws, the amendment would not much 
improve women’s legal status.  Nevertheless, political realities dictated that 
 
198  Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 129 (statement of Donna E. Shalala, President, Hunter 
College of the City University of New York). 
199  Memorandum from Sarah E. Burns to ERA Attorneys (Oct. 4, 1983) (on file with Sterling Me-
morial Library, Yale University, Thomas Emerson Papers, Box 23, Folder 344). 
200  Id. at 3.  Burns continued, “The crisis has blown over and the coalition survives.  A meeting with 
Metzenbaum is planned this week.  We may want to consider what acceptable qualifying detail should 
be submitted with the Shalala testimony to address this point.”  Id.  
201  Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 135 (testimony of Jeremy A. Rabkin, Assistant Pro-
fessor, Department of Government, and Director, Program on Courts and Public Policy, Cornell Univer-
sity). 
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proponents must establish some limiting principles to check the reach of 
disparate impact analysis.  Feminists steadfastly resisted pro-ERA legisla-
tors’ attempts to endorse a “foreseeable consequences” test, but they did 
find other ways to limit disparate impact analysis.  They assured skeptics 
that principles from equal protection and Title VII jurisprudence could pre-
vent the ERA from overreaching, even if the need to depart from the Davis-
Feeney line of cases remained a central premise of the amendment’s defini-
tion of equality.  As the next two sections describe, the ERA II hearings led 
feminists to make similar compromises with respect to other aspects of the 
amendment’s meaning. 
C. “Too Much Baggage for the ERA to Carry”: Private Conduct 
and the State Action Requirement 
Like disparate impact and affirmative action, the ERA’s effect on pri-
vate conduct was on proponents’ agenda as an issue for further research.  
However, feminist lawyers disagreed on how expansively they should char-
acterize the ERA’s reach into the “private conduct” of individuals and cor-
porations.  Some believed that proponents should minimize the extent to 
which the ERA would directly or indirectly affect private conduct.  They 
argued for incorporating the Fourteenth Amendment’s state action require-
ment into the ERA and against expanding the amendment’s reach beyond 
that authorized by the original legislative history of 1971 and 1972.  This 
more conservative approach bore a strong resemblance to proponents’ posi-
tion on affirmative action, described in the preceding section, in that it re-
lied on existing jurisprudence to delimit the ERA’s impact.  Some 
proponents even suggested incorporating into the ERA’s legislative history 
an intent to exempt private single-sex schools from the ERA’s reach.  Other 
feminist lawyers took a more aggressive approach, arguing for an interpre-
tation that would—like the disparate impact analysis described above—
extend the ERA’s reach beyond the strictures of existing state action doc-
trine under the Fourteenth Amendment.  As opponents charged that the 
ERA would authorize or even mandate sweeping incursions into the private 
sector, broadly defined, the amendment’s defenders ultimately settled upon 
an intermediate strategy designed to deflect skeptics’ concerns while leav-
ing open possibilities for more expansive interpretations. 
As soon as the hearings began, ERA opponents, led by Senator Hatch, 
focused upon the ERA’s impact on private educational and religious institu-
tions as the principal example of the amendment’s incursions into the pri-
vate sphere, with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bob Jones 
University v. United States as the central cautionary tale.  In Bob Jones, de-
cided just three days before the first hearing on ERA II, the Court had up-
held a decision by the Internal Revenue Service to revoke a tax exemption 
to Bob Jones University, a conservative evangelical institution that prohib-
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ited interracial dating among students.202  Read expansively, Bob Jones did 
not bode well for private single-sex schools or other entities that differenti-
ated between males and females and relied on federal assistance, either in 
the form of funding or exemption from taxation.  Read narrowly, the deci-
sion provided several bases for limiting its impact on such institutions. 
Many feminists’ initial inclination was not only to read Bob Jones ex-
pansively, but also to define the ERA as exerting significant impact on pri-
vate conduct.  At a May 1983 meeting immediately following the first 
Senate hearing, proponents strategized about how to respond to Hatch’s 
questions, which included queries about the effects of the ERA on private 
and religious schools and other entities.  The feminist lawyers concluded 
that “after Bob Jones, it seems that [private single-sex schools] must begin 
to accept the limits of their continued existence as single-sex schools.”203  
Long-time women’s rights advocate and ERA activist Catherine East dis-
sented from this view, suggesting that proponents put in the legislative his-
tory a clear indication that the ERA was not intended to apply to private 
single-sex schools.204  Advocates for a more expansive ERA interpretation 
continued to flesh out their view; in a July 1983 memo, ERA Legislative 
History Project coordinator Sally Burns recorded their assertion that  
[t]he reach of the ERA with respect to private education would depend on the 
extent of state involvement.  A private institution whose sex segregation poli-
cies could not be justified on the grounds of affirmative action might lose gov-
ernment funds.  Similarly, a private tax-exempt institution could lose its tax 
exemption . . . if its policies of sex discrimination were found to offend public 
policy.205 
This reference to public policy was a partial concession to the limits of the 
Bob Jones decision, which was predicated upon the unanimous consensus 
among the three branches of government regarding the abhorrent nature of 
race discrimination.  However, it emphasized the possibilities of using Bob 
Jones as a precedent for expansive interpretations of the ERA, rather than 
stressing the decision’s limitations.  
The debate among feminist lawyers over the ERA’s scope continued 
over the next several months.  East described the contending positions in an 
internal memo in October 1983: “The feminist legal community is attempt-
ing to secure legislative history that would require withdrawal of tax ex-
emption not only from private schools but from other single-sex private 
organizations unless ‘sex segregation is one part of a plan of affirmative ac-
 
202  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580–85 (1983).  
203  Memorandum from Marsha Levick to NOW-NOW LDEF ERA Legislative History Committee, 
supra note 107, at 5. 
204  Id. at 5 (urging in handwritten notes that the ERA is “not intended to affect single sex private 
schools”). 
205  Memorandum from Sally Burns, ERA Legislative History Project, to the Attorneys for the ERA 
and Working Groups for the ERA, supra note 197.  
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tion to overcome the past effects of discrimination’ against women.”206  This 
approach, she noted, had the support of NOW leaders Eleanor Smeal and 
Judy Goldsmith.  “My view,” wrote East, “is that this is too much baggage 
for the ERA to carry . . . .  I would like to see the legislative history clearly 
indicate that the ERA would apply only where ‘State action’ as defined in 
Supreme Court decisions is involved.”207  In suggesting this alternative 
strategy, East harkened back to the first ERA debates of the early 1970s: 
“The original ERA was not intended to apply to private schools, girl scouts, 
boy scouts, women’s hospitals, or women’s organizations, even if they re-
ceived some government funding.”208  To ask for more seemed to East stra-
tegically unwise, although she expressed wholehearted agreement with her 
colleagues’ substantive goals.  
Meanwhile, ERA opponents seized on Bob Jones to highlight the 
amendment’s potential to disrupt not only the educational autonomy of pri-
vate schools, but also the integrity of churches, seminaries, and other reli-
gious institutions.  The testimony of Cornell professor Rabkin was perhaps 
the most damning from the point of view of ERA skeptics: Rabkin con-
tended that the ERA would prohibit direct federal or state funding of single-
sex institutions, any federal and state subsidization of equipment for schools 
that differentiated between the sexes, and all tax exemptions for private in-
stitutions that treated men and women differently.209  Each of these out-
comes, Rabkin argued, followed logically from the ERA’s 
constitutionalization of an equivalence between race and sex discrimination.  
This equivalence, Rabkin submitted, was fundamentally misguided: 
Now we have done all this to private schools that persist in racial discrimina-
tion precisely to express an unyielding abhorrence to racist practices.  The 
question again is whether we want to oppose all aspects of sexual separation or 
differentiation with equally uncompromising condemnation, imposing the 
same financial penalties and the same moral stigma.  My own view is that 
there is something terribly wrong with a constitution that puts the sexual ex-
clusion of a Catholic seminary or a traditional women’s college on the same 
plane with the racial bigotry of a white supremacist ‘segregation academy’.210 
Rabkin’s implicit acceptance of the Bob Jones decision as correct rendered 
more credible his objections to extending the principle to cover sex dis-
crimination.  
 
206  Memorandum from Catherine East, ERA—Major Issues 3–4 (Oct. 11, 1983) (on file with Schle-
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207  Id. at 4. 
208  Id. at 3. 
209  Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 99–100 (statement of Jeremy A. Rabkin, Assistant 
Professor, Department of Government, and Director, Program on Courts and Public Policy, Cornell 
University). 
210  Id. at 110. 
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Rabkin’s testimony prompted ERA proponents to refine their position 
on private organizations and the relationship of the amendment to private 
conduct generally.  In a memorandum circulated to proponents a few weeks 
after Rabkin’s appearance before the Senate subcommittee, Sally Burns 
wrote to her compatriots of the need for clarification: “Rabkin drew a pic-
ture of sweeping state intervention into the private sphere and it was diffi-
cult to make a clear counter-record on his parade of horribles in oral 
testimony.”211  Burns’s memo suggested a subtle shift in the feminist law-
yers’ approach: now the task was “to have scholarly legal materials on the 
state action and tax exempt status issues on the record to demonstrate just 
how unlikely based on past court decisions Rabkin’s predicted sweep is.”212  
The perceived need to limit the ERA’s reach into the private sphere was 
driven home by Hatch’s summary of Donna Shalala’s testimony in the same 
hearing, which starkly portrayed her position as unremittingly hostile to sex 
differentiation in private as well as public education except where such dif-
ferentiation furthered affirmative action goals.213  
In an attempt at damage control, Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ), 
an ERA supporter, submitted questions to Shalala after the hearing that 
would enable proponents to clarify the ERA’s relationship to private con-
duct and existing state action doctrine.  Consultation with feminist lawyers 
Wendy Webster Williams and Ann Freedman produced a written statement 
from Shalala that “absent additional legislative or executive action, private 
institutions will rarely be subject to the requirements of the ERA just as pri-
vate institutions are now rarely subject to the 14th Amendment require-
ments.”214  As in the affirmative action context, existing Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence provided the limiting principle.  Further, on oc-
casion proponents emphasized that state action doctrine had evolved since 
the early 1970s to make private entities much less susceptible to lawsuits 
charging equal protection or other constitutional violations than they had 
been a decade earlier.215 
The feminist lawyers also offered a much narrower reading of Bob 
Jones than they had previously contemplated: they emphasized that Bob 
 
211  Memorandum from Sarah E. Burns to ERA Attorneys, supra note 199, at 3. 
212  Id. 
213  Impact of the ERA Upon Private and Parochial Education (circulated by Sen. Hatch) (Oct. 1983) 
(on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, Box 
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and colleges receiving any form of direct or indirect public funds, including tax exemptions, except for 
those all-women institutions based upon principles of ‘affirmative action.’  (Shalala: ‘I do not know of 
any institution in the country in which there is not public involvement.’)”). 
214  Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 169 (statement of Donna E. Shalala, President, Hunter 
College of the City University of New York, in response to questions of Senator Dennis DeConcini).  
215  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505 & n.10 (1985) 
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Jones was based on statutory rather than constitutional authority, and that 
the decision permitted, but did not require, the IRS to withhold tax-exempt 
status from racially discriminatory private organizations.  ERA proponents 
assured the subcommittees that Congress retained full discretion to grant 
tax exemptions to private organizations; failure to grant such exemptions 
could only occur if a robust public policy against sexual differentiation 
comparable to that against race discrimination were established.  In other 
words, sex-differentiating private entities could rest assured that the ERA 
would not affect their tax status unless a societal consensus developed that 
their policies were as abhorrent as racial discrimination.  Because oppo-
nents were fond of emphasizing that no such consensus yet existed, the 
danger of sex-differentiating institutions becoming “embittered,” “isolated,” 
or downright bankrupt as a result of the withdrawal of tax-exempt status 
was minimal.  Proponents also contended that the First Amendment would 
protect purely religious activities from the ERA’s reach under any circum-
stances, although the line between religious and secular activities remained 
notoriously difficult to draw. 
In the end, proponents’ position on the ERA’s impact on private enti-
ties and its relationship to existing state action doctrine occupied a middle 
ground between the cautious approach advised by East and the more expan-
sive interpretation advanced by other feminist lawyers.  Proponents’ treat-
ment of what was perhaps the most politically hazardous topic of the ERA 
II hearings, abortion, was also the product of an uneasy compromise among 
feminist lawyers and other ERA proponents.  
D. “An Untenable Position”: Abortion, Pregnancy, and the 
New ERA 
The “abortion-ERA connection” had been a centerpiece of Phyllis 
Schlafly’s STOP ERA campaign.  Opponents’ unremitting efforts to derail 
the amendment on this basis drove many proponents to elide or even deny 
the connection despite their firm conviction that reproductive freedom and 
sex equality were inextricably intertwined.216  During the ERA’s pendency, 
proponents engaged in a behind-the-scenes campaign of their own to keep 
feminist litigators from raising sex-based equal protection arguments 
against abortion restrictions in cases brought under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.217  The lawyers who argued Harris v. McRae,218 the 1980 federal abor-
 
216  MANSBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 124–25; Siegel, supra note 8, at 1397 (“As countermobilization 
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tional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007).  Siegel notes, “Appeals to sex equality as a legal basis for 
103:1223  (2009) A New E.R.A. or a New Era? 
 1275
tion funding case, refrained from making a sex-based equal protection ar-
gument, believing that Geduldig left them little chance of success.219  But 
even before, and especially after, the Court upheld the Hyde Amendment,220 
litigators at the state level could not justify withholding one of their best po-
tential weapons against abortion funding restrictions—state ERAs.221  As 
the prospect for the ERA’s ratification grew increasingly dim, maintaining a 
strict ERA-abortion separation no longer seemed to be worth pragmatism’s 
price.222 
When the ERA was reintroduced in 1983, proponents faced a poten-
tially fateful choice: they could continue to deny that the ERA would have 
any impact on abortion rights, or they could acknowledge the relationship 
between abortion and sex equality as a constitutional as well as a political 
and moral reality.  As the hearings and feminists’ internal deliberations 
went on, it became clear that neither of these dichotomous alternatives was 
politically viable.  To be candid about feminists’ hopes for the ERA and 
abortion rights would augur certain doom.  On the other hand, the way in 
which proponents denied or downplayed the “ERA-abortion connec-
tion”223—the reasoning they used, the doctrinal arguments upon which they 
relied—had significant ramifications not only for the abortion issue, but for 
other crucial aspects of the ERA’s new constitutional meaning and for fu-
ture battles over women’s legal status. 
Given the abortion issue’s prominence in the ratification struggle, fe-
minists were well aware that the hearings on ERA II would be a test of their 
ability to strike the right balance between candor and circumspection, bold-
ness and caution.  Exactly what that balance should be was a matter of con-
siderable dispute, however.  Feminists had disagreed over how best to 
handle the relationship between the ERA and reproductive rights in the dec-
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ade since Roe v. Wade catapulted the issue onto a national stage, but by and 
large they suppressed their differences to preserve a unified front.  Now the 
reintroduction of the amendment offered a second bite at the apple.  Attor-
ney Rhonda Copelon, who had argued the abortion funding case Harris v. 
McRae before the Supreme Court, expressed the views of many feminists in 
a Ms. Magazine article in October 1983: “The separation of abortion from 
the campaign for the ERA has jeopardized abortion and produced a trun-
cated version of liberation.”224  Feminists should embrace the ERA-abortion 
connection, Copelon suggested—if not with pride, then at least with grim 
determination.  Copelon’s analysis—frequently referenced by ERA oppo-
nents as evidence of feminists’ true intentions for the ERA—eschewed 
sharp boundaries between privacy and equality.225  
As ERA proponents prepared for the hearings in the spring of 1983, 
they considered a range of approaches to the abortion question.  A memo 
circulated by Marsha Levick to the ERA Legislative History Committee 
members in April laid out three alternative responses to the question, “Is a 
woman’s right to voluntarily choose to undergo an abortion enhanced, sus-
tained or diminished by a federal equal rights amendment?”226  As the bold-
est option, Levick articulated a vision of the abortion right “as an aspect of 
the right shared by men and women equally to control their reproductive 
capacity, and to retain for themselves the right to decide when and under 
what circumstances they wish to become a parent.”227  This vision of equal-
ity unashamedly linked abortion with both equal rights and privacy, and 
conceptualized reproductive freedom as a good that should be available to 
both men and women, rather than characterizing pregnancy as a “unique 
physical characteristic” subject to a different mode of analysis.  
The two other responses Levick outlined sacrificed this expansiveness 
at the altar of pragmatism.  One possibility was to say that the abortion right 
“is unaffected.  A woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy by 
abortion is a fundamental right which derives from her general right to pri-
vacy granted by the Constitution . . . articulated and recognized by Roe v. 
Wade,” so strict scrutiny should continue to apply to “all laws and regula-
tions impacting on a woman’s right to undergo an abortion.”228  The final al-
ternative was to treat abortion regulations as laws concerning “unique 
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physical characteristics,” subject to strict scrutiny under the ERA.229  On 
this view, discrimination against women on the basis of their ability to be-
come pregnant clearly constituted sex discrimination, repudiating the Su-
preme Court’s contrary decision in Geduldig v. Aiello.230  Levick recognized 
the need “to make the scope of [the ERA’s] coverage of [pregnancy-based 
discrimination] clear through legislative history,” because Geduldig had se-
vered the link between pregnancy and sex discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.231  
But, as Levick also recognized, it was difficult if not impossible to de-
ny a connection between the ERA and abortion while maintaining that the 
amendment addressed discrimination based on pregnancy.  As Levick put 
it, “If pregnancy-based discrimination is sex discrimination, it is difficult to 
substantiate the position that disparate or discriminatory treatment of wom-
en wishing to undergo abortion is not sex discrimination since abortion, like 
pregnancy, can only be experienced by women, and is clearly ‘pregnancy-
related.’”232  Not only would such a position produce logical dissonance, 
but, Levick argued, it would also compromise an important feminist princi-
ple: “To accept that abortion is unlike pregnancy would seem to suggest an 
acceptance of the right to life position, i.e., abortion is different because it 
involves another life (fetus) and other interests (spouse/father).  This seems 
to be an untenable position for the women’s movement to endorse, and a 
major step backwards.”233  The challenge for feminists was to find a way 
“[t]o ensure that pregnancy is subsumed in the definition of sex discrimina-
tion at the same time that we strive to maintain a low profile on abortion.”234  
In order to accomplish these objectives simultaneously, Levick wrote, “a 
combination of responses #1 and #2 would have to be put forward.”235 
Easier said than done.  As Levick’s memo suggested, feminists’ new 
definition of the ERA’s legal meaning put the pro-choice ERA advocates 
between a rock (pregnancy discrimination) and a hard place (disparate im-
pact analysis).  Denying the ERA’s impact on abortion rights risked excis-
ing pregnancy discrimination from the amendment’s definition of equality: 
if the ERA required strict scrutiny for laws relating to women’s unique 
physical characteristics (UPC), then it was difficult to see how the UPC cat-
egory could include pregnancy but exclude abortion.  At the same time, ap-
plying disparate impact analysis to laws regulating abortion produced a 
clear logical result—irrespective of one’s views on the morality of terminat-
ing a pregnancy, no one could dispute that restricting abortion, or funding 
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for abortion, had a disproportionate effect on women.236  Further, whichever 
box abortion was in—UPC or disparate impact—strict scrutiny would ap-
ply.  If the ERA was meant to elevate the level of scrutiny for sex discrimi-
nation to the same level as, if not a higher level than, that accorded to race 
discrimination, it was difficult to see how any restrictions on abortion 
would be valid under the ERA unless they served a compelling government 
interest.  And pro-choice advocates certainly were loath to concede that the 
protection of fetal life constituted such a compelling interest.  
Abortion had played only a minor role in the pre-Roe discussion of the 
ERA; during the ratification debates the discourse about the relationship be-
tween abortion and the ERA was largely heated rhetoric rather than intricate 
doctrinal parsing.  But in the hearings on ERA II, proponents could not 
evade pointed legal questions from a well-prepared and often sophisticated 
opposition.  In the first Senate hearing, pro-ERA witnesses attempted to 
skirt these questions.  Tsongas responded to Hatch’s questions about the 
amendment’s impact on abortion funding with his standard response that 
the issue would be decided by the courts.237  Marna Tucker demurred, say-
ing she did not know enough about the issue to answer.238  Then Hatch 
called on Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), author of the law prohibiting 
Medicaid funding for abortions, to testify about the ERA’s impact on the 
Hyde Amendment’s constitutionality.  Hyde invoked an analogy that anti-
ERA witnesses and legislators would repeat again and again through the 
hearings: “If sex discrimination were treated like race discrimination, Gov-
ernment refusal to fund abortions would be treated like a refusal to fund 
medical procedures that affect members of minority races.”239  Opponents’ 
favorite example was sickle-cell anemia.  As Grover Rees argued in the first 
House hearing, “[A] legislative program that funds other operations’ but not 
abortion would be constitutionally identical to a program that funded cures 
for every disease except sickle-cell anemia, to which only blacks are sus-
ceptible.”240  Representative DeWine proceeded to ask nearly every witness 
who came before the House about the validity of the sickle-cell anemia 
analogy, which proved difficult to refute.  Washington University professor 
Jules Gerard stated it in a later hearing, 
I find it remarkable, since [proponents] talk[] about the potential of ERA to 
overturn statutes which have a disparate impact on women, for them to con-
clude that the classical statute which must have a disparate impact on women 
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. . . would be unaffected.  All of a sudden, disparate impact is some irrelevant 
consideration.  I don’t understand their logic.241 
By the second House hearing, it had become clear that witnesses were 
susceptible to abortion-related questions regardless of their area of exper-
tise.  Feminist attorneys carefully briefed the pro-ERA witnesses on how to 
respond to these questions.  The strategy, in essence, was to state that abor-
tion rights were protected by privacy jurisprudence under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, implying that the ERA was redundant rather than revolution-
ary while leaving the door open to a legislative history free of unequivocal 
statements about the ERA’s irrelevance to reproductive rights.  Striking this 
delicate balance—difficult even in theory—proved very nearly impossible 
in the hearing room.  When DeWine asked the witnesses about the ERA’s 
impact on the Hyde Amendment, long-time women’s rights advocate Ber-
nice Sandler deftly replied that while she was not a legal expert, she wanted 
to “reiterate . . . that the Supreme Court has not viewed abortion under the 
Equal Protection Clause as a civil rights issue.  They have always viewed it 
in terms of due process and privacy, and that is where the Court has been 
coming from all along.”242  So far, so good, but DeWine pressed further—
“Is [the] panel’s opinion . . . that the passage of the ERA would not in any 
way affect the right to an abortion or any legislation that might follow?”—
prompting Tish Sommers of the Older Women’s League and Diana Pearce 
of Catholic University’s Center for National Policy Review to declare, that 
the ERA would have “no relationship” to abortion.243 
The feminist lawyers responsible for coordinating proponents’ testi-
mony were dismayed.  Burns wrote to her colleagues in early October, “All 
the September 14 House witnesses were briefed on the abortion answer.  
Still some went too far and said ‘no relation,’” an understanding subse-
quently memorialized by House counsel in a summary interpretation to be 
used by members of Congress in their own testimony.244  “Obviously,” 
Burns wrote, “legislative history to that effect is troubling to pro-choice 
concerns.”245  Meanwhile, congressional proponents of the amendment 
regularly labeled the issue a “red herring.”  They had a point—as Senator 
Packwood told Hatch, “[M]y hunch would be if you put the strongest anti-
abortion rider on this amendment that you could dream up, it would not 
change a single antiabortion vote toward the amendment.”246  But remarks 
like Representative Charles Schumer’s (D-NY) compounded the problem: 
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[A]bortion has nothing to do with discrimination between men and women, pe-
riod, until the time when a man can have an abortion or become pregnant, and 
then maybe it will have something to do with it.  But until that point we ought 
to just abandon that argument and throw it out. . . .  It is just ridiculous, I have 
to say that.247 
Moreover, proponents continued to argue about how to respond to 
questions about public funding for abortion.  Catherine East recorded in Oc-
tober that Rutgers law professor Ann Freedman “believe[d] the ratification 
of the ERA [would] not affect Supreme Court decisions on Medicaid fund-
ing,” while others, including Marcia Greenberger and Judy Lichtman 
“[thought] that it [would] (or hope[d] that it [would]) if we don’t have in the 
legislative history any statement that it won’t have any effect or that ERA 
had ‘no relation’ to abortion.”248  Greenberger and Lichtman counseled 
Freedman “to ‘stonewall’ if Congressman DeWine presse[d] her with ques-
tions and not to state her legal reasoning for thinking it [would] have no 
impact.”249  East agreed with Freedman, and suggested that in order to ward 
off the inclusion of an antiabortion rider to the ERA, proponents offer “a 
clear unequivocal statement in the House Committee report that it is not the 
intent of the Congress that the ERA have any impact on abortion.”250  In the 
final House hearing on ERA II, Freedman and Emerson reiterated the ar-
gument that courts would continue to decide abortion cases under the right 
to privacy, regardless of the ERA’s fate.  While feminist lawyers were scru-
pulously careful not to disavow all connection between the new ERA and 
abortion, their strategy of circumvention fell far short of many feminists’ 
aspirations for the ERA.  
E. The Dual Strategy Revisited 
As ERA I’s official expiration date neared, Senator Slade Gorton, a 
moderate Republican from Washington State, conferred with the eminent 
constitutional scholar Gerald Gunther about an alternative strategy for 
achieving “equality of rights under the law.”  Why not legislate the sub-
stance of the ERA with a bill designed to achieve the amendment’s aims 
without submitting to Article V’s requirement of state approval, Gorton 
wondered?  Gunther’s reaction was positive.  “I continue to believe that this 
is a notion worth pursuing,” the Stanford law professor wrote to Gorton in a 
letter dated July 1, 1982, the day after the ratification deadline.251  He noted 
 
247  House Hearings, supra note 79, at 237 (testimony of Representative Charles E. Schumer). 
248  Memorandum from Catherine East, supra note 206, at 1. 
249  Id. 
250  Id. 
251  Letter from Gerald Gunther, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, 
to Sen. Slade Gorton, (July 1, 1982) (on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard Uni-
versity, NOW Papers, Box 191, Folder 9) (indicating that the two men had had a recent telephone con-
versation). 
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that such a bill would expand the definition of equality beyond that author-
ized by the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, but concluded, “[S]urely 
you have a sufficiently substantial legal ground to warrant going ahead with 
a clear constitutional conscience.  The politics of it . . . may be another mat-
ter, but you are a far better judge of that than I.”252 
Just as they had spurned well-meaning attempts to substitute a “wom-
en’s equal protection clause” for an ERA a dozen years earlier,253 women’s 
organizations rejected Gorton’s proposed “Equal Rights Bill.”  They under-
stood the bill to be “a well-intentioned effort.”254  However, after inviting 
feedback from dozens of groups and individuals concerned with women’s 
rights, the coalition’s response was decidedly negative.  Feminists had 
many quibbles with the details of the particular bill Gorton drafted, but 
most of their objections would have applied to virtually any piece of legis-
lation designed to accomplish the ERA’s goals without amending the Con-
stitution.  The Gorton bill essentially proposed to extend the Equal 
Protection Clause’s most robust protections, formerly accorded only against 
racial discrimination, to women.  According to a NOW LDEF memo sum-
marizing the reactions of feminist advocates to the proposal, this approach 
had several fatal flaws.  First, critics noted the obvious fact that as a statute, 
the provision would be “vulnerable to amendment or repeal.”255  Second, 
feminists worried that the Court would not sustain such legislation as a va-
lid exercise of Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because opponents could persuasively “claim that Congress is 
seeking to invalidate laws that the Supreme Court, left to its own devices, 
would uphold.”256  Third, the advocates worried that any bill seeking to alter 
judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause would lend legitimacy 
to the “Human Life bill,” an attempt by antiabortion lawmakers to change 
the definition of “persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment.257  
Finally, and perhaps most fatally, the Gorton bill risked perpetuating 
the very flaws in equal protection jurisprudence that the ERA was meant to 
transcend.  As the memo put it, “The Equal Protection Clause itself carries 
some very unfortunate baggage,” including the requirement that “men and 
women must be similarly situated in order for discrimination to exist,” and 
the fact that “proof of intent has been required even in ‘disparate impact’ 
cases.”258  Further, there was “no guarantee that even a command that courts 
employ ‘strict scrutiny’ will overcome the tendency, particularly of the Su-
 
252  Id. 
253  I discuss these efforts in detail in Mayeri, supra note 16. 
254  Memorandum from Phyllis Segal & Anne Simon to Feminist Attorneys (July 22, 1982) (on file 
with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, NOW Papers, Box 191, Folder 9). 
255  Id. at 1. 
256  Id.  
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preme Court, to take a narrow view of ‘equal protection’ for women.”259  
These shortcomings made feminists determined to pursue their goals 
through constitutional amendment rather than legislation, despite their 
poignant recognition that passage and ratification was likely to take “an-
other ten years.”260  
Gorton’s aides tried to assure the women’s coalition that the equal 
rights bill was designed to “complement a renewed [ERA] ratification ef-
fort, not to supplant it.”261  But just as many feminists had been wary of dis-
tracting state ERA campaigns in the final years of ERA I’s ratification 
battle, they knew they lacked the resources and political capital to fight on 
multiple fronts in Congress.  The coalition decided to oppose the Gorton 
bill and “put[] all our energies into the Equal Rights Amendment.”262  This 
decision hardly put to rest the dilemmas associated with pursuing legal and 
constitutional change through multiple avenues. 
As I have explored elsewhere, in the 1960s, legal feminists surmounted 
internal divisions within the women’s movement to coalesce around a “dual 
strategy” for constitutional change.263  After decades of division over the 
strategy and substance of achieving constitutional equality for women, legal 
feminists—led by pragmatic strategists like Pauli Murray and Mary East-
wood—determined to pursue litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment 
and advocate for an ERA simultaneously.  The dual strategy enabled femi-
nists to transcend their longstanding differences over the proper constitu-
tional home for women’s rights, and allowed them to pursue their goals on 
multiple fronts.  But as the ERA ratification debate dragged on for over a 
decade, the logistical complexities of the dual strategy mounted.  Success-
fully arguing that the Equal Protection Clause guaranteed the very rights 
feminists sought from an ERA undermined the need for a new amendment, 
while continuing to press for a new amendment implied that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was wanting even as litigators argued the opposite in court.   
The dilemmas of the dual strategy did not disappear when the states 
failed to ratify the ERA, but they transmogrified.  By 1982, the Court had 
resolved, for better or for worse, many of the equal protection questions that 
feminists had litigated during the 1970s—the status of laws that assumed 
women’s economic dependency, pregnancy discrimination, disparate im-
 
259  Id. at 1. 
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pact, the military draft.  Cases like Geduldig,264 Feeney,265 and Rostker266 had 
defined the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment, closing off possibilities 
that had remained open in the early 1970s.  On the other hand, the Reed-
Frontiero line of cases had established that many laws that classified men 
and women on the basis of sex would be subjected to heightened scrutiny, 
and often struck down as perpetuating stereotypical sex roles.267  When the 
ERA was reintroduced in 1983, feminists had the luxury of knowing how 
the contours of equal protection jurisprudence had developed, an advantage 
they lacked in 1972.  In areas where equal protection had fallen short—
pregnancy discrimination, disparate impact, and military equality among 
them—feminists did not have to worry as much about how their arguments 
about the ERA would affect their fortunes in Fourteenth Amendment litiga-
tion.  Nor, by definition, did they have to fear that progress achieved under 
the Fourteenth Amendment would undermine their arguments for an ERA.  
Some of the old dilemmas of the dual strategy remained, however.  
Since long before congressional passage of the original ERA, opponents of 
the amendment—who once upon a time had included many women’s rights 
advocates—had argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause could provide the salutary aspects of an ERA without its alleged ri-
gidity.  In the debates over ERA II, opponents continued to press this line of 
argument, with a great deal of additional ammunition.  Since the Court’s 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence had evolved, opponents contended 
that the only further changes an ERA would bring were, at best, contrary to 
public opinion, and at worst, disastrous.  Anti-ERA witness Grover Rees, 
for instance, emphasized that any legislative revisions that the amendment 
would require or inspire were “superfluous, because that can be done under 
the equal protection clause.”268   
 
264  Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1974) (holding that discrimination based on preg-
nancy does not necessarily violate the Equal Protection Clause).   
265  Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding that the foreseeably disparate impact 
of state action is insufficient to demonstrate discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and that 
the action must be performed “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of’ its adverse effects upon an identifi-
able group”). 
266  Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 77, 79 (1981) (holding that exempting women from register-
ing under the Military Selective Service Act is constitutional because women and men are not similarly 
situated since women are excluded from combat positions in the military). 
267  See cases cited supra note 61. 
268  House Hearings, supra note 79, at 33 (statement of Grover Rees III, Assistant Professor of Law, 
University of Texas School of Law).  Said former Representative Charles Wiggins, “I concluded thirteen 
years ago that . . . our present constitution, particularly the Fourteenth Amendment, was fully adequate 
to the legitimate needs of all our people for fair treatment.  Nothing has occurred in the interim to alter 
my conclusion, and indeed recent decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Fourteenth Amend-
ment have fortified that conclusion.”  Id. at 357 (statement of Charles Wiggins).  As Reva Siegel has 
demonstrated, during the ratification debates ERA opponents largely accepted the Court’s reinterpreta-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause, characterizing these changes as acceptable, in contrast to the havoc 
that an ERA would wreak.  Siegel, supra note 8, at 1403. 
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Changes brought about under Title VII further fortified this argument.  
However, ERA proponents emphasized the continuing disparities between 
women’s and men’s earnings to justify the ongoing need for an ERA.  But, 
the problem with proponents’ reasoning was that it was difficult to see how 
an ERA would affect wage inequality in light of existing laws mandating 
equal pay for equal work.269  As they had been during the ratification cam-
paign, ERA opponents were quick to counter assertions that the amendment 
would narrow the wage gap by pointing out that unlike Title VII, the ERA 
would not cover private employers.  Rees declared in the first House hear-
ing on ERA II that while proponents often emphasized that the ERA would 
affect state action only, “we hear that the equal rights amendment is going 
to solve . . . the 59-cents-on-the-dollar-problem.  You cannot have it both 
ways.  Overwhelmingly, the discriminating employers are private employ-
ers.”270  Some took the argument a step further, suggesting that if existing 
antidiscrimination laws had not successfully eliminated the wage gap, then 
differences between men’s and women’s incomes must be attributable to 
factors other than discrimination.  Statistician Carl Hoffman noted that 
advocates of the ERA state specifically that an amendment is required in order 
for women to achieve the same changes as blacks have achieved . . . .  The re-
sults of much of my work argue rather that the mechanisms causing the differ-
ences in income between men and women are of a different type than those 
that caused the differences between blacks and whites.271 
For instance, “women have been less aggressive in seeking promotions and 
this is true even in companies that have encouraged them equally,” and 
women were disproportionately burdened by their family responsibilities, a 
disparity that the ERA would not touch.272 
While feminist advocates like Donna Shalala and Bernice Sandler ar-
gued that the ERA was necessary to “eliminate the gaps in coverage under 
existing laws,”273 opponents responded that these “gaps” were not the unfor-
tunate result of shortsighted policymaking, but rather of purposeful, sensi-
ble line-drawing by judges and legislators.  As Professor Rabkin put it, 
referring to the differences between Title IX’s coverage and the ERA’s 
mandate, “These are not gaps.  They were deliberate decisions to set up the 
law one way, rather than another way.  They are an expression of legislative 
judgment; they are an expression of concern to be flexible and to be reason-
 
269  MANSBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 38–40. 
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272  Id. at 488. 
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able . . . .”274  Others suggested that the ERA’s other effects imposed too 
high a price to pay for the amendment’s limited effects on women’s eco-
nomic equality.  Schlafly made this point in particularly colorful terms.  She 
argued that, given the changes precipitated by Title VII, Title IX, and the 
Equal Protection Clause, the ERA’s sole effect on women’s employment 
opportunities would be to eliminate the bona fide occupational qualification 
exception for public jobs.  Schlafly declared: 
For this, we are asked to constitutionalize taxpayer-funding of abortions and 
homosexual marriages, allow our daughters to be drafted and sent into combat 
just like our sons, forfeit veterans’ preference and tax exemption of religious 
schools, sacrifice traditional rights of wives, abandon our right to have single-
sex schools and extra-curricular activities, pay greatly increased insurance 
premiums, and transfer enormous new powers from the states to the federal 
courts.275 
Neither had the old dilemma that arguing for a new amendment had the 
potential to undermine favorable judicial interpretations of existing provi-
sions disappeared.  For instance, proponents’ assertion that the ERA would 
provide a firmer basis for congressional legislation designed to prevent or 
ameliorate sex discrimination risked suggesting that Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment did not already authorize such action.  But what pro-
duced the most troublesome tension between ERA advocacy and other 
constitutional and statutory provisions were the arguments feminist litiga-
tors had advanced under the Equal Protection Clause, Title VII, and the 
state ERAs with respect to pregnancy discrimination and abortion funding.  
Feminist lawyers had vigorously pursued an expansive definition of sex 
discrimination in earlier pregnancy discrimination cases, a definition they 
now hoped to incorporate into the new ERA.  Opponents regularly noted 
that laws concerning pregnancy—a “unique physical characteristic” just 
like abortion—very much came within the ambit of sex equality, according 
to the same ERA proponents who now sought to dissociate the amendment 
from abortion.  Moreover, they regularly emphasized that pro-choice advo-
cates had cited state ERAs to support their contention that state constitu-
tions required public funding of abortions.  Opponents’ favorite smoking 
gun was a 1980 newsletter item from the Civil Liberties Union of Massa-
chusetts: 
The state Equal Rights Amendment provides a legal argument that was un-
available to us or anyone at the federal level. . . .  Because a strong coalition is 
being forged between the anti-ERA coalition and the anti-abortion people, it 
was our hope to be able to save Medicaid payments for medically necessary 
abortions through the federal court route without having to use the state Equal 
 
274  Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 157 (statement of Jeremy A. Rabkin, Assistant Profes-
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Rights Amendment and possibly fuel the national anti-ERA movement.  But 
the loss in [Harris v. McRae] was the last straw.  We now have no recourse but 
to turn to the State Constitution for the legal hook to save Medicaid funding 
for abortions.276 
Pro-choice advocates in Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and other states had made 
similar calculations.  ERA skeptics not unreasonably wondered why, if fe-
minists argued that the sex equality guaranteed by state ERA encompassed 
government funding for abortion, the federal ERA would not be impressed 
into the service of the pro-choice cause.  
Proponents’ attempts to distance themselves from pro-abortion funding 
arguments made under state ERAs were also in some tension with their po-
sition on gay rights.  Whereas feminists hoped to draw attention away from 
the state ERA experience when it came to abortion, the Washington ERA 
case Singer v. Hara277 served as the centerpiece of proponents’ case for the 
federal ERA’s inapplicability to matters of sexual preference.  Proponents 
regularly cited Singer as proof that the federal ERA would not mandate 
same-sex marriage or other rights for homosexuals.278   
At the same time, feminists did not necessarily want the emerging ju-
risprudence under state ERAs wholly to define the federal ERA’s meaning.  
State ERAs had produced a variety of results, and not all of them had ful-
filled feminist hopes.  Nor did feminists wish to leave the impression that 
state ERAs were sufficient replacements for a federal amendment.  Feminist 
leaders also worried that campaigns for new state ERAs would divert en-
ergy and resources away from the federal ERA campaign.  After consider-
able friction with state organizations, leading national women’s groups had 
called for a moratorium on advocacy for new state constitutional amend-
ments in 1980.279   
Pursuing legal change on multiple fronts continued to complicate fe-
minists’ constitutional amendment advocacy.  The old dilemmas of the dual 
strategy were in some ways muted by caselaw development under the Four-
teenth Amendment and by the opportunity, now that the first ERA had gone 
down to defeat, to redefine the amendment and distinguish its meaning 
from existing sex equality jurisprudence.  But if the old dual strategy di-
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lemmas had largely, though not completely, receded into the background, 
new strategic puzzles had emerged.  Most prominently, attempts to pin re-
productive rights to sex equality under state ERAs, the federal Constitution, 
and statutory provisions, undermined federal ERA proponents’ efforts to 
deflect attention from the “abortion-ERA connection.”  Feminists, already 
profoundly ambivalent about the strategic separation of reproductive rights 
from the ERA, found themselves compelled to compromise once again. 
III. THE LEGACIES OF ERA II 
In the end, proponents’ strategic compromises proved insufficient to 
save ERA II.  Despite the best efforts of feminists and their congressional 
allies, ERA II’s potency as a political weapon ultimately proved of limited 
utility.  Nevertheless, the debate over ERA II was of lasting significance to 
the history of legal feminism.  The hearings pushed proponents to hone new 
doctrinal proposals that balanced feminists’ aspirations with concerns about 
judicial manageability and practicality.  They also drove home the limita-
tions of constitutional amendment advocacy as a means to the ends legal 
feminists sought.  And for scholars, the debates over ERA II provide an in-
valuable picture of how the legal and political landscape changed and failed 
to change over one of the most transformative decades in women’s legal 
history. 
A. “We Have to Have a Vote, Win or Lose”: ERA II’s Career 
as a Political Weapon 
NOW and NWPC officials and House leaders agreed in November 
1983 that supporters would bring the ERA to a floor vote with a closed rule 
that would prohibit amendments, forcing members to vote yes or no.  “We 
have to have a vote, win or lose,” declared Judy Goldsmith, as feminists 
promised to campaign against ERA opponents in the 1984 elections.280  An 
L.A. Times editorial warned that “a failure to stand up for equality this time 
could affect political careers more than standing up for it did in 1972.  
Women are far more politically active now than they were then.”281  As 
Mary Frances Berry recounts, feminist strategists believed the ERA had a 
chance of passing the House, in which case they could concentrate on win-
ning Senate support.282  If the amendment failed to pass, or passed the Sen-
ate with crippling exemptions, they could make conservative opposition a 
campaign issue.283 
 
280  Associated Press, Rights Amendment Stressed as a Major 1984 Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
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Forcing the vote and stifling attempts to amend infuriated many Re-
publicans, with Representative Larry Craig (R-ID) chastising Speaker 
O’Neill, “Shame on you, Mr. Speaker, shame on you.”284  House Minority 
Leader Robert Michel (R-IL) complained, “The majority is engaging in an 
abuse of power that would bring a blush to the cheeks of the most absolute 
despot of antiquity.”285  The ERA fell six votes short of the two-thirds ma-
jority needed for passage, 278-147.286  Representative Hamilton Fish (R-
NY), a cosponsor of the ERA, said that Democrats’ procedural move was 
nothing more than “partisan politics in search of a campaign issue.”287  But 
Republican feminist Kathy Wilson, chair of the National Women’s Political 
Caucus, warned, “We now know the truth about our representatives’ com-
mitment to equality, and those who voted against us will soon learn the 
consequences of the gender gap.”288  The New York Times quoted a Democ-
ratic aide as saying that “his party’s leaders doubted they would win the 
vote . . . but that with the roster of Republican ‘nays,’ Democratic campaign 
strategists were ‘licking their chops.’”289  The Times disapproved of this un-
seemly politicking, opining the next day that the vote against the ERA “had 
less to do with the substance of the amendment than with exploiting the 
‘gender gap’ and targeting E.R.A. opponents for defeat in next year’s elec-
tions.”290  This “cynical gambit,” the editorial writers wagered, “may have 
done the E.R.A. . . . more harm than good.”291  ERA champion Representa-
tive Patricia Schroeder defended proponents’ decision in a Wall Street 
Journal op-ed a few weeks later, noting that suspending normal rules of de-
bate had been integral to the passage of other bills, including important civil 
rights legislation.292 
Whatever the merits of this last-ditch parliamentary maneuver, it high-
lighted the role that constitutional amendment advocacy now played for the 
women’s movement and for partisan politics.  Fighting for the ERA had be-
come a potent political weapon in an increasingly polarized and partisan 
atmosphere.  Many of the ERA’s congressional allies apparently saw the 
amendment primarily in those terms: Senator Tsongas’s avoidance of spe-
cifics in the first hearing on ERA II was less a reflection of his lack of prep-
aration and more of a desire to view the amendment in symbolic, political 
terms.  For lawmakers like Tsongas, the ERA was less a bundle of intricate 
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legal doctrines than a referendum on conservative legal and political posi-
tions on civil rights.  The early House hearings in particular were replete 
with references by pro-ERA witnesses to the failures of the Reagan Ad-
ministration to vigorously enforce civil rights laws, with an emphasis on the 
weakness of the Executive Branch’s commitment to women’s rights.  The 
Administration’s deficiencies in this regard demonstrated the need for a 
constitutional amendment, proponents argued, because the important busi-
ness of equality clearly could not be left to the vagaries of bureaucratic 
whim.  When the Administration protested that it truly was committed to 
women’s rights, just not to a constitutional amendment, feminists dismissed 
its desultory proposals as “band-aid” solutions to a gaping constitutional 
wound.  The President and his allies would pay for their opposition to the 
ERA, proponents warned again and again.293  
Facing growing criticism from within the Administration as well as 
without, the White House proposed eliminating sex-biased language from a 
number of federal laws.  But even the head of the DOJ’s Civil Rights Divi-
sion admitted that the changes were mostly “cosmetic.”294  ERA supporters 
seized on Justice Department attorney Barbara Honegger’s high-profile res-
ignation to highlight stark assessments of the Reagan Administration’s 
women’s rights record.  Honegger professed to have had faith in Reagan’s 
commitment to eradicate sex discriminatory laws as a substitute for sup-
porting the ERA, but, she reported, “not a single law has been changed.”295  
Of Reagan, Honegger told the Washington Post, “He doesn’t deserve loy-
alty because he has betrayed us.”296  Editorialists used Honegger’s resigna-
tion to renew their call for “ERA II.”297  Meanwhile, Democratic 
presidential candidates tripped over each other in their eagerness to claim 
their reverence for the amendment and their commitment to its passage.  To 
the chagrin of many moderate ERA proponents, several went so far as to 
threaten to withhold money for federal programs and projects from states 
whose legislatures would not ratify.298  
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Foot-in-Mouth Syndrome Has Democrats Courting Disaster, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 1983, at E5.  See also 
Eleanor Randolph, Mondale Calls Reagan ‘Khomeini-Like’ in His Women’s Rights Policy, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 20, 1984, at B9. 
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For feminists, scoring political points was clearly a second-best out-
come, and the opportunity proved short-lived and ultimately futile.  For a 
time, prospects for a women’s renaissance looked somewhat promising.  
The Los Angeles Times heralded NOW’s emergence as a “mainstream 
force,” noting that the organization’s annual convention had become an ob-
ligatory stop for serious Democratic presidential hopefuls.299  Feminists ral-
lied around the first female vice-presidential nominee, Geraldine Ferraro,300 
and hoped to abort the Reagan Revolution with a 1984 election victory.301  
Of course, it was not to be, and the Reagan landslide was accompanied by a 
gain for the President’s party of sixteen seats in the House and only minor 
losses in the Senate.  The much-touted gender gap had done feminists little 
electoral good.302  Many pundits and politicians were beginning to conclude 
that the gender gap was less about women’s chagrin over the Reagan Ad-
ministration’s failure to support the ERA and abortion rights, and more 
about women’s concern about the ballooning defense budget and draconian 
spending cuts on social and economic programs.303  Moderates lamented the 
conservative takeover of the GOP, epitomized by, among other things, the 
rejection of a proposal to include support for the ERA in the 1984 Republi-
can platform.304  Pro-ERA members of Reagan’s cabinet, like Transporta-
tion Secretary Elizabeth Dole, suspended their ERA advocacy in deference 
to the President’s position.305  The heady excitement generated by Geraldine 
 
299  Beverly Beyette, NOW Flexing New Political Muscle, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1983, at I2. 
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TIMES, July 13, 1984, at A8. 
301  Republican feminists shared this hope.  See Howell Raines, President Is Assailed by Women’s 
Leader; 2d Term Is Opposed, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1983, at 1. 
302  Media coverage of the ERA was replete with warnings to the Reagan Administration about the 
“gender gap” and potential political fall-out among female voters.  See, e.g., Editorial, The Gender Gap, 
L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1983, at C4.  
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proposed [ERA] are factors in Mr. Reagan’s problems.  But there is also widespread agreement that 
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William Endicott, Dallas Proving to Be No Place for Party’s Moderates, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1984, at 
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Ferraro’s vice-presidential candidacy was short-lived.306  The brief career of 
the ERA as political weapon seemed over for good.  
However, ERA II arguably epitomized and reinforced a trend toward 
the introduction and promotion of constitutional amendments primarily for 
symbolic political purposes, with little or no expectation of ultimate passage 
and ratification.  After the ERA’s defeat, conventional wisdom held that Ar-
ticle V’s prescribed process was no longer a viable path to constitutional 
change, except perhaps for very specific, technical alterations.307  But bids 
to amend the Constitution hardly ceased; rather, they continued to provide 
opportunities to make a dramatic statement of dissatisfaction with existing 
constitutional provisions or their interpretation by courts, to force others to 
take uncomfortable political stances, and to provide a forum for debating is-
sues of principle without committing to any concrete changes in the law.308  
Though the ERA’s career seemed over for the time being, the concept of 
proposed constitutional amendment as political weapon emerged very much 
alive. 
B. ERA II and the Reconstitution of Feminism 
By the mid-1980s, most feminists agreed that the ERA’s time had 
come and gone.  Former NOW ERA activist Mary Jean Collins wrote in 
1987 that proposals to reintroduce the amendment “ignore[] the lessons of 
the past and [are] the pursuit of predictable failure . . . .  Rather than rushing 
into a costly and premature effort to change the Constitution, the women’s 
movement needs to address the hard task of creating a true consensus for 
equality.”309  Catharine MacKinnon’s assessment was much harsher: she 
questioned not the wisdom of seeking transformative change or doing so 
through a constitutional amendment, but rather whether the ERA as con-
ceived by most of its supporters would have changed much of anything im-
portant.  In an impassioned 1987 book review, she castigated feminists for 
what she characterized as their impoverished conception of sex equality, 
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ford Levinson ed., 1995); JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN 
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tutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001); Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The 
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309  Mary Jean Collins, Book Notes, 244 NATION 692 (1987) (reviewing MANSBRIDGE, supra note 7, 
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nourished by their deliberate underestimation of the inequality and injustice 
facing women.  She lamented their failure to fight for a meaningful consti-
tutional amendment that would move beyond a focus on sex-based legal 
classifications to attack the root causes of male domination.310  “[T]he 
ERA’s legal impact,” MacKinnon asserted, “need not have been confined to 
being the women’s auxiliary of the equal protection clause.”311  Whether 
they believed the quest for ERA I was too ambitious or not ambitious 
enough, renewing that quest in earnest was on almost no one’s agenda in 
the aftermath of ERA II’s defeat. 
Proponents’ failure to effectively use the ERA for electoral gain and 
feminists’ despair of the prospects for reintroduction should not obscure the 
legacies of ERA II as an important turning point in feminist legal history.  
First, the debates over ERA II provided a forum for feminists to consider 
what kind of legal and constitutional change they wanted to achieve and 
pushed them to translate an abstract equality principle into specific doctrine.  
Second, the ERA II struggle drove home for feminists the limitations of 
constitutional amendment as a vehicle for achieving their aspirations.  Fi-
nally, the ERA II episode marked a crucial transition point in feminists’ de-
finition of legal equality.  1983 was hardly the first time that feminists had 
struggled with the tension between seeking formal equality of treatment and 
a more substantive version of equal rights under law, but ERA I’s demise 
provided an opportunity to acknowledge publicly the shortcomings of a fo-
cus on the eradication of sex-based legal classifications and to develop a 
more expansive vision of equality.  As such, ERA II was not merely a reit-
eration of ERA I, not simply a postscript to a failed ratification campaign, 
but a revealing moment in the evolution of legal feminist thought and strat-
egy. 
Of course, feminists had grappled with doctrinal questions concerning 
the proper constitutional standard of review for laws exerting a dispropor-
tionately negative impact on women before 1983.  They had faced the ques-
tion head-on as they challenged veterans’ preference laws, culminating in 
the unfavorable 1979 Supreme Court decision in Personnel Administrator 
v. Feeney.  As we have seen, though, several factors limited their ability ful-
ly to theorize constitutional disparate impact in the context of the Feeney 
case.  First and foremost, in Feeney, feminists were operating within the 
confines of an equal protection jurisprudence that had enshrined discrimina-
tory intent as the sine qua non for determining when a facially neutral law 
violated equal protection.  Accordingly, the appellee in Feeney closely ad-
 
310  Catharine A. MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA Thinking, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 764 (1987) (re-
viewing MANSBRIDGE, supra note 7) (“[T]he continual revisions of the public image of what the ERA 
‘would do,’ equivocations designed to win over the opposition by reassurance, did effectively vitiate the 
potentially explosive organizing effect the ERA might have had on those who had the world to gain 
from actual sex equality.”). 
311  Id. at 765.  
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hered to the intent requirement, arguing that all circumstantial evidence 
pointed to a legislative intent to discriminate against women.  Feminist or-
ganizations took the argument a step further, advocating for what was, in 
practice, a substantial relaxation of the intent requirement, but they did so in 
large part on the ground that the veterans’ preference’s disproportionate ef-
fect on women was due almost entirely to longstanding de jure discrimina-
tion against women by the government—restrictions on women’s 
participation in the military.  Women’s groups argued that a stringent intent 
requirement made little sense in the context of sex discrimination, where 
“benign” assumptions about women’s “place” in society, rather than overt 
hostility, often animated laws with a negative impact on women’s opportu-
nities.  But they worked within the Washington v. Davis framework and 
within the parameters set out by the district court opinion striking down the 
Massachusetts statute, which, like most cases, did not invite imaginative, 
expansive theories about constitutional doctrine. 
After the Feeney decision dashed feminists’ hopes for a more expan-
sive reading of the Equal Protection Clause, they increasingly turned to the 
ERA as a repository for their hope that the Constitution would vanquish 
laws exerting a disparate impact on women.  As such, feminists projected 
that the ERA would, if ratified, attack facially neutral as well as explicitly 
discriminatory laws.  But, as discussed earlier, neither the climate of the ra-
tification battle nor the political costs of specificity invited careful consid-
eration of particular doctrinal ramifications.  It was easy for feminists to say 
they wanted something better than Feeney, but it was more difficult and 
strategically risky to articulate exactly what.  Leftover strategic reluctance 
persisted in the early ERA II hearings, especially given opponents’ ten-
dency to depict disparate impact analysis as a euphemism for “quotas.”  But 
when opponents probed beneath the surface, proponents were compelled to 
provide a much more specific account of ERA disparate impact doctrine, as 
we saw in Part II. 
The products of these deliberations had a life beyond the ERA II hear-
ings and embodied the shifting orientation of post-ERA feminist jurispru-
dence.  Phyllis Segal, whose memos had informed congressional testimony 
about the details of disparate impact doctrine under ERA II, published a 
more detailed version of her theory in the Buffalo Law Review in 1984.312  
Citing Ann Freedman’s ERA II testimony before Congress, Segal consid-
ered and rejected proposals to enact a less stringent intent test and instead 
endorsed the “limiting principle[s]” developed during the hearings.313  Rely-
ing on these limiting principles, she situated feminists’ new disparate im-
pact analysis in the context of previous attempts to improve on the 
Davis/Feeney framework.  The renaissance of disparate impact analysis was 
 
312  Phyllis N. Segal, Sexual Equality, the Equal Protection Clause, and the ERA, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 
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not confined to participants in the ERA II campaign.  Then-law student Re-
va Siegel published a note in the Yale Law Journal advocating a disparate 
impact reading of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in March 1985.314  
Without such an analysis, she argued, the PDA would be a weak weapon 
against sex inequality in the workplace. 
The renewed enthusiasm for disparate impact analysis was also evident 
in an influential article authored by Wendy Williams and Nadine Taub in 
the same year.315  In a widely cited 1982 article, Williams had grappled with 
the question of how to reconcile sex differences with the equal treatment 
model of sex equality analysis that dominated 1970s feminist litigation.316  
The “crisis” she described stemmed from an intense and sometimes bitter 
dispute among feminists over whether to support legislation that gave preg-
nant women special benefits not available to other persons temporarily un-
able to work.  In that piece, Williams framed what is often called the “equal 
treatment versus special treatment” debate in rather stark terms, arguing that 
“[i]f we can’t have it both ways, we need to think carefully about which 
way we want to have it.”317  In her view, “for all of its problems, the equal-
ity approach is the better one.”318  
But two years later, Williams and Taub suggested that perhaps femi-
nists need not choose between the Scylla of assimilation/formal equal-
ity/individual treatment and the Charybdis of accommodation/real equality/
group treatment after all.319  Instead, like Segal and Siegel, they suggested 
revitalizing disparate impact analysis: “In short, our hope is that by stress-
ing the common origin of facial discrimination and neutral rules with dispa-
rate impact we can revive a commitment to eliminating real barriers to 
women’s full societal participation.”320  They also hoped to transcend the 
conflict between “equal treatment” and “special treatment” feminists by 
framing the question in terms of effects: employers would be forbidden to 
create a special category for pregnancy, but any employment policy would 
be suspect if it had a disparate impact on women.  Thus, if a neutral disabil-
ity benefits policy protected women to a lesser degree than men by, for ex-
ample, providing disability leave for all employees insufficient to 
accommodate pregnancy, it would be susceptible to challenge. 
 
314  Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 
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Williams and Taub recognized the formidable “practical and political” 
obstacles in the way of a full-blown assault on laws and policies with a dis-
parate effect on women.  This “resistance,” they believed, derived from 
“three related concerns: the absence of a requirement that ‘intent’ be proved 
as an element of discrimination, the costs that may result, and the lack of 
immediately apparent limits on the doctrine’s sweep.”321  Thus, though they 
wished to preserve the Griggs concept “intact . . . as a secondary approach,” 
they “would seek to overcome this concern by identifying acceptable lim-
its.”322  The limits they identified were virtually the same limits developed 
in the course of the ERA II hearings: “At a minimum . . . those neutral rules 
which are traceable to, build on, reproduce or perpetuate the old notions and 
hierarchies must be justified by a business necessity.”323  Indeed, Williams 
and Taub cited the testimony of Segal and Freedman from the 1983 hear-
ings to support their analysis.  
Two years later, Ann Freedman and Sylvia Law challenged the argu-
ment advanced by political scientist Jane Mansbridge that the ERA, by the 
time of its demise, would have had little practical effect on the law.  On the 
contrary, they asserted, “The ERA would have had a profoundly important 
impact on laws and policies that discriminate in fact, but not in words.”324  
Whether ERA I would have had such an effect is unknowable, but feminists 
had certainly done all they could to ensure such a meaning for ERA II.  Al-
though they had frequently relied on the Equal Protection Clause for limit-
ing principles in the ERA II hearings, disparate impact analysis was a 
crucial area in which proponents made clear how the amendment would de-
part, rather dramatically, from existing equal protection jurisprudence. 
If the life of disparate impact analysis illustrates how the ERA II de-
bates helped to redefine the meaning of “equality of rights under the law,” 
the compromises proponents made during the hearings highlight the limita-
tions of the ERA as a means for accomplishing the ends feminists sought.  
The paradox of the legal feminist position after the demise of ERA I is 
striking.  For the first time in over a decade, feminists were in a position to 
shed the constraints of the ratification process and reconsider the scope of 
their aspirations for legal and constitutional change.  On the other hand, the 
defeat of ERA I reflected the increasingly conservative political climate in 
which feminists operated.  The reintroduction of ERA II meant that femi-
nists had the opportunity to create a new legislative history for the amend-
ment, one that reflected their current aspirations.  But attempting to achieve 
these changes through the same constitutional amendment that had proven 
so controversial even before conservative domination of the Executive 
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Branch and the Senate placed severe political constraints on feminists’ at-
tempts to reconfigure and expand the ERA’s meaning.  After the disap-
pointments of ERA I and II, feminists could understandably conclude that, 
as Mary Jean Collins put it in 1987, “constitutional amendments serve to ra-
tify the present rather than paving the way for the future.”325  
The ERA II experience highlighted the Catch-22 in which feminists 
found themselves: every victory they won in incorporating their more ex-
pansive visions of equality into the amendment’s legislative history would 
cost them votes, if not in Congress, then in the state legislatures.  Feminists 
were already cognizant that constitutional amendment might not be the best 
vehicle through which to achieve their goals—hence their ambivalence 
about the ERA’s reintroduction in the first place.  The ERA II experience 
could only have reinforced those doubts. 
Indeed, doubts about the wisdom of seeking change through constitu-
tional amendment went beyond the practical political difficulties of ratifica-
tion in the absence of consensus; it also entailed significant strategic 
drawbacks.  Keeping the federal ERA in play constrained the arguments 
feminists felt they could make in litigation under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and under state ERAs.  Whereas the ERA campaign, at its height, had 
arguably strengthened feminists’ case for constitutional change through ju-
dicial reinterpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, continuing to press 
for the amendment in the face of determined and successful opposition 
tended to highlight the distance between feminists’ aspirations and the ex-
tent of popular agreement.  Further, proponents would always be subject to 
accusations of duplicity so long as they claimed that a clear legislative his-
tory would constrain the ERA’s future application when they not-so-
secretly hoped that future electoral victories would produce more sympa-
thetic judges who would interpret the ERA’s abstract wording more expan-
sively. 
Though it would be easy to overlook them given the more prominent 
political constraints on the ERA’s meaning, the ERA II debates also re-
vealed certain stubborn substantive limitations that proved less than amena-
ble to reinvention.  It was particularly difficult for proponents to dispel the 
notion, which the amendment’s original legislative history had itself pro-
moted, that the ERA embodied essentially a singular principle of absolute 
equal treatment.  That notion, useful in the early debates over ERA I be-
cause of proponents’ desire to rid the law books of explicit sex-based classi-
fications, bred confusion about the impact of the ERA on affirmative action 
and other policies that did not fall into this category.  By the time of ERA 
II, feminists hoped the amendment would promulgate an antihierarchy prin-
ciple of sorts in the form of disparate impact analysis.  But as the debates 
over ERA II and the subsequent controversy over pregnancy benefits re-
vealed, feminists struggled to agree on what such an antihierarchy principle 
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would look like in practice.  Seeking change through a constitutional 
amendment begged not only for internal consensus on what means were 
best suited to the ends of antisubordination, but also a singular principle that 
would be applicable across various circumstances and areas of the law.   
Indeed, in this respect, feminists had come full circle.  Whereas femi-
nist ERA skeptics of the pre-1970s era had bemoaned the ERA’s “rigidity” 
and lack of “flexibility” because it might endanger protective labor legisla-
tion, proponents of ERA I steadfastly insisted on an equality principle of 
virtually universal applicability.  Along these lines, the authors of the 1971 
Yale ERA Article wrote, “the interrelated character of a system of legal 
equality for the sexes makes a rule of universal application imperative.  No 
one exception, resulting in unequal treatment for women, can be confined in 
its impact to one area alone.  Equal rights for women, as for races, is a uni-
ty.”326  Now some feminists again began to question the feasibility of apply-
ing a universal principle to a complicated and diverse array of problems.  
Some younger feminist scholars, examining the ERA ratification battle 
from an academic perspective, wondered whether continuing a polarizing 
struggle was the best way to unite women whose interests were far more 
harmonious than the rancor of ERA rhetoric would suggest.  Deborah 
Rhode, a young Stanford Law School professor, suggested that the women 
to whom Schlafly’s movement had appealed were reachable, but that “fe-
minists might do well to pause in the pursuit of an increasingly divisive 
constitutional symbol and focus on more concrete responses to structural 
inequities.”327 
Feminists had also become more cognizant of the limitations of a con-
stitutional amendment that did not reach private action.  Even proponents’ 
wildest imaginations could not transform the ERA into an affirmative duty 
on the part of the government to take active steps to remedy inequality in 
the absence of a proven constitutional violation.  As proponents acknowl-
edged—and emphasized to skeptics—the ERA was a limitation on state ac-
tion and a license to legislate, but not an unavoidable imperative to remedy 
inequality.   
More generally, proponents recognized, constitutional adjudication had 
its limits as a tool for pursuing legal change.  Williams said as much in her 
influential critique of 1970s Supreme Court sex equality jurisprudence: “To 
say that courts are not and never have been the source of radical social 
change is an understatement.”328  Legislation would be the means of achiev-
ing feminists’ ultimate goal of redefining the meaning of equality itself.  
“[T]o the extent that the law of the public world must be reconstructed to 
reflect the needs and values of both sexes, change must be sought from leg-
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islatures rather than the courts,” Williams wrote.329  Section 2 of the ERA 
provided a basis for such legislation, but as we saw in Part II, ERA propo-
nents had to tread carefully in claiming a role for section 2 beyond that of 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.330  While the Court had decided 
many Fourteenth Amendment questions unfavorably during ERA I’s pend-
ency, the expansive reading of Congress’s Section 5 enforcement power 
remained largely undisturbed, and feminists certainly did not wish to imply 
that a narrower reading was appropriate. 
At the same time, the Court’s increasingly conservative race jurispru-
dence not only made it less advantageous for feminists to analogize the 
ERA’s impact to the treatment of race discrimination under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, it also threatened—or at least complicated—coalitions be-
tween racial justice and feminist organizations.  As Freedman and Law 
recalled in 1987, “[ERA] proponents had no desire to urge that women were 
entitled to a greater measure of constitutional protection than black people.  
Rather, most ERA proponents sought common cause between those who 
struggled against racism and sexism.”331  ERA supporters hoped and be-
lieved that “the ERA’s stronger protection against laws that were sexist in 
impact would have a spillover effect extending stronger protection to blacks 
injured by laws that were racist in impact.  But it was difficult to use the ac-
tual words of the ERA to support this pragmatic belief.”332  No doubt it was 
also politically inexpedient to highlight this “spillover effect,” because it 
played into the hands of opponents who forecasted dire consequences for 
the ERA beyond the realm of sex equality. 
Significantly, the internal debates among feminists over ERA II’s rela-
tionship to abortion and reproductive rights, and the uneasy compromise 
presented in the hearings, drove home many feminists’ increasing unwill-
ingness to divorce constitutional sex equality from reproductive freedom.  
Advocates like Rhonda Copelon called explicitly for a reunification of sex 
equality and abortion rights in 1983.  Other prominent feminist lawyers 
soon followed suit.  Sylvia Law’s Rethinking Sex and the Constitution and 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Rela-
tion to Roe v. Wade were two of the more prominent published expressions 
of this view.  Ginsburg, by then a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit, acknowledged “the view that for political reasons the re-
productive autonomy controversy should be isolated from the general de-
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bate on equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for women and 
men,” but ultimately rejected that view.333  Law similarly acknowledged that 
[t]o assert that the fourteenth amendment or a state ERA mandates a concept 
of sex equality that encompasses a woman’s interest in controlling reproduc-
tive capacity would inescapably affect the effort to enact a federal ERA.  Nev-
ertheless, it is important to explore the political and legal separation of sex 
equality and reproductive freedom and to evaluate the value of a more inte-
grated approach.334  
Others were less circumspect about suggesting a change of course.  In 
a brief but influential essay written in 1983, MacKinnon offered a searing 
critique of feminists’ earlier decision to rest the campaign for abortion 
rights on privacy grounds, rather than on a rationale based in equality or 
freedom.335  By 1991, NOW activist Twiss Butler joined MacKinnon in ex-
coriating the ERA campaign for asking too little of constitutional equality, 
especially in the context of abortion and pregnancy, and cited the 1983 
ERA II hearings as her primary example.336  In her own retrospective ques-
tioning of feminist strategy, MacKinnon suggested that she had held her 
tongue while the ERA was still in play, but once the amendment appeared 
dead once and for all, “[t]here seemed little to lose, even from the truth.”337 
Whether one was sympathetic or impatient with feminists’ concessions 
to the political exigencies of the ERA debates, it was clear that feminists 
would fight the battles of the 1980s and 1990s on new terrain.  Without a 
constitutional amendment hanging in the balance, feminists were free to 
draw connections between areas of law formerly considered taboo.  Uncon-
strained by what they now perceived as the strictures of “formal equality,” 
they explored new frontiers of legal intervention like disparate impact anal-
ysis and comparable worth, legislation to enact economic rights for women, 
and an embrace of reproductive rights and eventually sexual freedom as es-
sential components of sex equality.  From the debates over ERA II, femi-
 
333  Ginsburg, supra note 225, at 386. 
334  Law, supra note 217, at 987. 
335  CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy Versus Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93, 93–103 (1987). 
336  Twiss Butler, Abortion Law: ‘Unique Problem for Women’ or Sex Discrimination?, 4 YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 133 (1991).  She wrote: 
Suppose that [ERA supporters] had responded to the accusation that the ERA would mean abor-
tion on demand by agreeing enthusiastically, adding that the ERA would not only prohibit legal 
barriers to abortion and public funding of abortion, but would also protect women from such other 
forms of pregnancy discrimination as forced sterilization of minority women, denial or surcharg-
ing of pregnancy coverage on private medical expense and disability income insurance, punitive 
treatment of maternity leave, and suppression of contraceptive information in public school curric-
ula. 
Id. at 138.  
337  Catharine A. MacKinnon, Excerpts from MacKinnon/Schlafly Debate, 1 LAW & INEQ. 341, 341 
(1983). 
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nists emerged intent on pursuing not merely “equality in theory,” but 
“equality in fact.” 
CONCLUSION 
The story of ERA II sheds light on themes important both to historians 
and to scholars of social movements and constitutional change.  The ERA II 
campaign confirms the imperative to look beyond courts and litigation as 
sites of constitutional conflict.  The process whereby proponents of consti-
tutional change attempted to create new legislative history for an already 
controversial and much-debated amendment provides an intriguing example 
of the extrajuridical creation of constitutional meaning.  It proved to be one 
in which dialogue with opponents was virtually unavoidable.  This dialogic 
process included not only feminist and antifeminist movement activists, but 
also congressional combatants—lawmakers with various stakes in the de-
bate over ERA II.  In part because the debate took place in the context of 
congressional consideration of the amendment—rather than, say, in the 
course of litigation or of a ratification campaign directed at state legisla-
tures—ERA II’s trajectory highlighted the potential of proposed amend-
ments to serve as partisan political battering rams.   
The debate over ERA II also proved a formative one for the social 
movement that somewhat reluctantly sponsored its reintroduction, yielding 
substantive and strategic reassessments on the part of advocates at a transi-
tional moment in the history of legal feminism.  Thus the story of ERA II 
highlights the significance of even failed attempts to amend the Constitu-
tion, not only to the extent that they influence judicial reinterpretation of ex-
isting constitutional provisions—as the ERA I campaign arguably did—but 
also in their role as a vehicle for social movement agenda-setting.  
From an historical standpoint, the ERA II debates underscore the scope 
and limitations of the legal and political changes feminists and their oppo-
nents achieved between the introduction and passage of ERA I in the early 
1970s, and ERA II’s ultimate defeat in Congress in 1983 and 1984.  An 
amendment with broad-based bipartisan support had become a partisan 
weapon deployed by politicians and advocates across the political spectrum.  
Moreover, because feminists had achieved much of the agenda set out in the 
original ERA I hearings but still faced a determined and well-organized op-
position to their residual goals, by the early 1980s the amendment had ac-
quired new legal meanings.  A decade of political struggle over the ERA, 
reproductive freedom, and civil rights more generally made a new set of is-
sues salient: facially neutral laws exerting a disproportionate impact on 
women replaced overt sex-classifications as the primary target of feminist 
legal strategy, while resurgent conservatism placed battles over abortion, 
state action, homosexuality, and the military at the center of the struggle.  
But the ratification debates had proven more conducive to histrionics, 
innuendo, and outrage than to sustained doctrinal parsing.  Feminists were 
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understandably ambivalent about defending ERA II so soon after ERA I’s 
demise, but recognized that for better or worse, they had to decide exactly 
what they could ask of the amendment, legally and politically.  Opponents 
asked difficult and probing questions about the amendment’s specific legal 
ramifications, compelling a response from supporters.  Proponents’ internal 
debates and the public testimony they produced revealed both creative 
thinking about doctrinal possibilities and a sense of painfully acquired real-
politik.  Some of the positions feminists took in the ERA II hearings, such 
as the development of a more sophisticated disparate impact analysis, laid a 
promising foundation for future advocacy; others, such as the pained ma-
chinations surrounding the relationship between the ERA and reproductive 
rights, revealed the limitations of amendment advocacy as a means to the 
ends feminists sought. 
The introduction, consideration, and defeat of ERA II marked a pivotal 
moment in the history of legal feminism.  Far more than a mere postscript 
to the battle over ERA I, the debate over ERA II helped to redefine both the 
strategy and the substance of the feminist legal agenda.  Substantively, the 
ERA II debate solidified an emerging shift from formal equality to a con-
cern with disparate impact and combating hierarchy.  Moreover, the debate 
forced feminists to grapple with the specific doctrinal dilemmas entailed by 
this shift.  Strategically, ERA II enabled feminists to explore the possibili-
ties of using a proposed constitutional amendment as a partisan political 
weapon and embodied a new electoral turn in movement politics.  Ulti-
mately, ERA II drove home the limitations of constitutional amendment as 
the means to feminist ends, but the process of constructing a new meaning 
for the amendment had important and lasting effects on the legal feminism 
that emerged, reconstituted, from the ashes of defeat.  
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